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I.   INTRODUCTION
Most testators are bent on providing for their families, and be-
quests to close relatives dominate the typical estate plan. Nonethe-
less, some testators harbor the different, or additional, concern of
leaving funds for the furtherance of some purpose or cause, in which
they feel an interest—be it broadly philanthropic (poverty relief, for
example) or narrowly egocentric (say, construction of a monument).
Bequests of this sort are often clothed in a trust, setting out some
purpose which the trustee is directed to accomplish or promote with
the allocated funds.1 Historically, the common law divided trusts for
purposes into three sub-categories: those for charitable purposes,
serving the public interest; those for noncharitable purposes, accom-
plishing merely private ends; and those for purposes deemed by
lawmakers to violate public policy.
The Restatement of Trusts, promulgated in 1935 under the stew-
ardship of Professor Austin Scott, established the modern American
doctrines following under each of these heads.2 Trusts for charitable
purposes are effective and fully enforceable by the state attorney
general, as representative of society at large. These trusts can per-
                                                                                                                      
* ã1999. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, Florida State University. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987, Yale
University. Thanks to Rob Atkinson, Jesse Dukeminier, Larry Garvin, and William McGov-
ern, Jr., for helpful comments. Some of the research for this Article was conducted during
the author’s stint as Roger Traynor Summer Research Professor, endowed at the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am profoundly grateful to the Hastings faculty,
and to the Traynor family, for their generous support.
1. For discussions of estate planning options open to the testator minded to accom-
plish a charitable purpose, see JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING
§ 8 (1992); Carolyn C. Clark & Glenn M. Troost, Forming a Foundation: Trust vs. Corpora-
tion, 3 PROB. & PROP., May-June 1989, at 32; Gail K. Neuharth, A Primer on Private Foun-
dations, 12 PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 33; and for the testator who seeks to effectu-
ate a noncharitable purpose, see William F. Fratcher, Bequests for Purposes, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 773 (1971); Nancy G. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in Wills, (pt. 2), 43
PRAC. LAW., July 1997, at 15, 20-21; David Howard, A Will to Live, PETLIFE, Oct.-Nov. 1997,
at 50; Barbara W. Schwartz, Estate Planning for Animals, 113 TR. & EST. 376 (1974).
2. On the legal history of purpose trusts prior to the Restatement, see Adam J.
Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 35-44 (1999).
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sist for as long as the testator wishes, even in perpetuity.3 Trusts for
noncharitable purposes, on the other hand, are unenforceable by the
attorney general on the ground that they do not affirmatively benefit
society. Because a purpose trust has no “beneficiary” in the tradi-
tional sense, no one else has standing to sue the trustee in equity for
its specific performance. Nevertheless, the trustee does have a power
to carry out a noncharitable purpose trust, and alternative benefici-
aries (either remaindermen, residuary legatees, or heirs) retain
standing to sue for the trust’s termination, in the event that the
trustee balks. Accordingly, trusts for noncharitable purposes are
styled honorary trusts: that is, trusts which the trustee is honor
bound, though not legally bound, to perform. These are limited in
duration to the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 Finally,
trusts for purposes contrary to public policy are neither enforceable
nor even permissible for any space of time—they are simply void per
se.5
This trio of doctrines has persisted without challenge in the
United States for over half a century. But lately, and for the first
time, the Commissioners have taken up these issues; they have done
so within the compass of a massive, and in many respects innovative,
revisitation of the substance of probate law, the revised Article II of
the Uniform Probate Code of 1990 (with technical amendments in
1993), expounding model rules of legislation rather than adjudica-
tion.6 Despite controversy over a number of its novelties,7 this docu-
ment has made slow but gradual headway; its purpose trust provi-
sions have already had an impact on the law in a number of states.8
The Commissioners’ decision to promulgate a corpus of rules ap-
plicable to trusts for purposes was taken with little fanfare,9 and it
                                                                                                                      
3. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 348, 364-65, 391 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 348, 364-65, 391 (1959).
4. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 124 & cmts., 418 & cmts. (1935); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 123-24 & cmts., 418 & cmts. (1959).
5. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 62 & cmts. a, n & o, 124 cmt. g, 374 cmt. l, 377 &
cmts. a-c, 418(c) & cmt. b (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 62 & cmts. a, v &
w, 124 cmt. g, 374 cmt. m, 377 & cmts. a-c, 418(c) & cmt. b (1959).
6. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, pt. 9 (amended 1993). Trusts for purposes were ad-
dressed neither in the original, 1969 version of the Uniform Probate Code, see id. app. VII,
nor in earlier model acts, see LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE
LAW, INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946); UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT (1937), 7B U.L.A.
763 (1985 & Supp. 1997).
7. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or
More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993); Jesse Dukeminier, The
Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 94 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1995);
Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital Children—Exploring the 1990 Uniform Pro-
bate Code’s Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539 (1998).
8. See infra note 13.
9. The drafters of the revised Code have produced a raft of articles publicizing and
advocating its sundry innovations. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate
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has attracted correspondingly little notice; no commentator hereto-
fore has subjected the Commissioners’ efforts to critical review. That
is the ambition of this Article. The task is particularly relevant just
now, because another body of Commissioners, charged with produc-
ing the Uniform Trust Act, will speak to the matter of purpose trusts
and must decide whether or how closely to follow their predecessors’
lead.10 And a new generation of Restators is also clearing its collec-
tive throat: The Restatement (Third) of Trusts, currently in progress,
must either take its cue from Professor Scott or rework the doctrines
he enshrined in the original Restatement and the Restatement (Sec-
ond).11
Yet the task is not entirely welcome, however well-timed. Plowing
across the landscape of a code can be tedious. In undertaking close
analysis of rather arid statutory provisions, the risk of longeuers
runs high.12 And while a glance at the uniform laws on point reveals
a number of improvements over the common law, which are a pleas-
ure to highlight, the same sections also betray significant lapses of
thought and even of technical virtuosity that no one can delight in
elaborating.
Still and all, there are important lessons to be learned from this
exercise—lessons for today’s drafters, immersed in these particular
trust doctrines; and lessons for tomorrow’s drafters—to be addressed
at the end of this Article—regarding the code-making enterprise
generally.
II.   SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS
The provision of the Uniform Probate Code that addresses trusts
for purposes is an optional section.13 It covers any “trust . . . for a . . .
                                                                                                                      
Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309
(1996) [hereinafter Waggoner, Poorly Drafted Trusts]; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Revised
Uniform Probate Code, 133 TR. & EST., May 1994, at 18; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal
Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1992). Nonetheless, trusts for purposes are nowhere to be found
within this body of promotional literature.
10. The new Uniform Trust Act is presently in the discussion-draft stage. See UNIF.
TRUST ACT (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). As currently drafted, it does follow the Uniform
Probate Code in many respects, as we shall see. See also infra note 168.
11. The substantive body of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (following accelerated
publication in 1992 of its provisions on the fiduciary duties of trustees) is now in the tenta-
tive draft stage. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 10,
1999). The draft remains incomplete, however, and some aspects of purpose trust law (for
example, charitable trusts) have yet to be addressed, even tentatively.
12. I have elsewhere offered a more extensive theoretical inquiry into the problem of
purpose trusts. See Hirsch, supra note 2.
13. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE pt. 9, sub-pt. 2, general cmt., § 2-907 (amended 1993). Of
the eleven jurisdictions that have thus far adopted the revised Article II of the Uniform
Probate Code, four (Hawaii, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota) chose not to in-
clude the optional section. The optional section appears today (with stylistic and other revi-
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lawful noncharitable purpose.”14 That brings up the first notable as-
pect of the Commissioners’ treatment of this subject matter: the lim-
ited nature of their coverage. Instead of comprehending the full
range of purpose trusts within the Uniform Probate Code, the Com-
missioners confined themselves to one slice of the problem, omitting
from the Code’s purview charitable trusts. The explanation is not far
to seek. The Code was never intended to provide a thorough
reformulation of the law of trusts, but merely a revision of “certain
procedures to facilitate [their] enforcement.”15 Testamentary trust
law in all its minutiae is ostensibly a separate subject, left by the
drafters for another day.16 But whatever the convenience of these
lines of demarcation, their conceptual arbitrariness is plain
enough17—all the more so in the present context, given the Commis-
sioners’ negative phraseology: The Code’s provision concerning
trusts for noncharitable purposes leaves the student hunting in vain
through the table of contents for their affirmative counterparts.
This omission is by no means fatal, of course. The Uniform Pro-
bate Code is a “common law code” rather than an all-embracing code
in the civil law tradition.18 In the absence of relevant provisions, the
                                                                                                                      
sions) in seven codes: ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
2907 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-901 (1998) (with substantive revisions noted in-
fra notes 59, 69, 165); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999) (effec-
tive Apr. 1, 2000); MONTANA CODE ANN. § 72-2-1017 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-907
(Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1001 (1993 & Supp. 1998). For
other state statutes covering noncharitable purpose trusts, see infra notes 50, 61, 65, 126,
128, 165. Some of the language found in the optional section (especially in its process provi-
sions) was borrowed, more or less verbatim, from a preliminary model proposed by an advo-
cate outside the Uniform Conference of Commissioners. See Letter from David Rees to
Richard Wellman & Larry Waggoner (Oct. 24, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rees
Proposal]; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-904[(e)[(f)] (Discussion Draft, Dec. 1-3, 1989)
(making reference to the Rees Proposal); infra note 172. This preliminary model was ac-
companied by notes which, though not included in the brief comment following the optional
section of the Uniform Probate Code as ultimately promulgated, nonetheless express the ra-
tionales motivating the language proposed. That this language was subsequently adopted
by the Commissioners without significant revision suggests that the drafters of the Code
found the rationales expressed in the notes persuasive, and so they will be quoted below as
suggestive, if not dispositive, of the policies and legislative intent of the Commissioners in
adopting the optional section and in framing it as they did.
14. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993).
15. Id. preamble.
16. But compare the Commissioners’ further submission that “[t]he concept of the
Code is that the ‘affairs of decedents . . .’ is a single subject of the law notwithstanding its
many facets.” Id. preamble, cmt.
17. This is hardly the only example of arbitrary omission from the Code premised on
artificial conceptual distinctions. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1112 n.162 (1996).
18. Gaps in the Uniform Probate Code are to be filled by “the principles of law and eq-
uity.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-103 (amended 1993). This vague language is borrowed from
the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. § 1-103 & cmt. (amended 1990); in the latter
Code, courts have interpreted the language to refer to state law (despite the rather glaring
absence of an explicit reference to it), rather than adopting as a uniform law whatever is
the majority common law rule. See In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1960).
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local law of charitable trusts remains intact. A trifle more troubling
is the Commissioners’ failure to define their terms. Neither the op-
tional section, nor its comment, nor the separate definitional section
of the Code sets out the indicia of what a “noncharitable” (or, con-
versely, a “charitable”) purpose is.19 Again, by implication, local law
fills the gap. Hence, the Commissioners have constructed a uniform
mechanism of noncharitable trust, without positing a uniform defini-
tion of the trust purposes it is intended to carry into execution. Just
how concrete that definition ought to be remains a question—by tra-
dition, the legal attributes of charity (and non-charity) have been
open-textured20—but, in light of some arbitrary variations of local
precedents,21 the Commissioners might have seized the day to estab-
lish a common conceptual framework, with the end of eliminating
whatever pointless disharmony exists among the states. At least by
making an explicit reference in the Code to the application of local
law, the Commissioners would have reassured us that they had
weighed this opportunity but had found cause to decline it.22
The Commissioners also let slip the occasion to address issues ly-
ing at the other edge of purpose trust law—that is, the category of
trusts contrary to public policy. Here, too, the Commissioners chose,
more overtly though with annoying economy, to punt the matter
                                                                                                                      
Whether that was the original meaning of this phrasing is unclear: The U.C.C. provision de-
rived in turn from earlier uniform laws, and it appears to have been carried forward
thoughtlessly. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 73 (1906); UNIF. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT § 56
(1906); UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 196 (1896). Also unclear is whether passage
of section 1-103 of the Uniform Probate Code is intended to freeze into place pre-Code law
to the extent it is needed to fill in the Code’s lacunae, or whether state law within the
Code’s lacunae can continue to evolve subsequent to the Code’s passage. For a suggestion of
the second interpretation in connection with the U.C.C., see ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL.,
COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.04[2], at 1-7 (1985).
19. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 1-201, 2-907 (amended 1993).
20. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Charities Soc’y v. South Carolina Nat’l Bank, 495
S.E.2d 199, 201 (S.C. 1997). “Continually broadening and changing, it is not only impossible
but also unwise to attempt to define precisely the concept of charitable purpose, for its
scope changes with the times so as to fulfill . . . evolving ideas of social benefit.” EDITH L.
FISCH, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 256, at 229 (1974) (footnote omitted).
Also defending a flexible definition of charitability, see, for example, Great Britain’s Nathan
Report, quoted in 4A AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368, at 135 (William F.
Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp., Mark L. Ascher ed., 1997). I have elsewhere argued that
the substantive distinction between charitability and noncharitability should be eliminated
altogether. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 52-69, 84-110.
21. See Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes
Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1341 (1995).
22. In contrast with the Uniform Probate Code, the draft of the Uniform Trust Act
does contain a definition of charitability. See UNIF. TRUST ACT § 408(a) & cmt. (Discussion
Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). This definition follows the Restatement verbatim. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). Though the section of the draft Uniform Trust Act de-
voted to noncharitable purpose trusts does not explicitly define them, their definition fol-
lows by negative implication, as well as from examples and references to the Restatement of
Trusts provided in the accompanying comment. See UNIF. TRUST ACT § 407 & cmt. (Discus-
sion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999).
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back to the states. Re-reading the language of the optional section,
only a “trust . . . for a . . . lawful noncharitable purpose” is effective.23
This qualification implies that some purposes will be found unlawful,
and wanting elaboration within the Code as to what those might be,
we look again to local precedents24—another lost opportunity to re-
think the common law.25
Only in one particular do the Commissioners possibly venture
into this region of purpose trust law—possibly, I say, because their
language is ambiguous. Before examining the provision in question,
we need to lay out a bit of background. Under the common law, as set
down in the Restatement, a trust for a purpose is void if it is found to
be “capricious.”26 According to the Restatement, capriciousness can
turn on either qualitative or quantitative criteria: A trust is void if it
fails to “satisf[y] a natural desire which normal people have with re-
spect to the disposition of their property,”27 and it is also void if the
sum allocated to an otherwise reasonable purpose is “unreasonably
large.”28 In the second case, some courts have claimed authority to
pare down the corpus allocated to a purpose in order to bring it
within the bounds of legal acceptability. In effect, these courts take a
remedial approach to the problem, validating trusts for purposes pro
tanto.29 At the same time, courts have always had the responsibility
                                                                                                                      
23. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993) (emphasis added).
24. On the other hand, looking to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (6th ed. 1990), the
word lawful is defined as “legal; . . . not illegal.” On strict reading, then, “lawful” means not
forbidden by a law, rather than (merely) contrary to public policy. Compare the Uniform
Trust Act draft, under which “[a] trust may be created only if its purposes are lawful, [and]
are not contrary to public policy. . . .” UNIF. TRUST ACT § 405 (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9,
1999). In short, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code have left themselves vulnerable to
construction litigation over whether trusts for any purpose not literally illegal are intended
to be rendered effective by the language of the optional section quoted supra in text at note
23.
25. I have elsewhere argued that such a rethinking is warranted. See Hirsch, supra
note 2, at 69-84. But the drafters of the Uniform Trust Act have also passed up this oppor-
tunity, thus far: For elaboration of what constitutes an invalid trust purpose, they refer
back to the Restatement. See UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 405 cmt., 407 cmt. (Discussion Draft, Feb.
9, 1999).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959).
27. Id. The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts offers a change of tone,
if not of tune: “A purpose is not capricious . . . if it satisfies a desire that many (even if not
most) people have with respect to the disposition of their property.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 10, 1999).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 10, 1999).
29. Courts in Pennsylvania, applying a state statute permitting trusts in perpetuity for
grave care, have claimed authority to reduce to reasonable sums lavish bequests for such
care. See Devereux’s Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491, 496-97 (Orphans’ Ct. 1943); In re Dreis-
bach’s Estate, 121 A.2d 74, 79 (1956); Palethorp’s Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C. 215, 221, 224 (Or-
phans’ Ct. 1914), aff’d, 94 A. 1060, 1066 (1915), appeal dismissed, 94 A. 1066 (1915). In some
jurisdictions, statutes authorizing perpetual cemetery trusts limit the sum so bequeathed to
a fixed monetary amount, or to a “reasonable” amount, and give the court authority to re-
duce bequests accordingly. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-110 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
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to return (via resulting trust) property transferred over and above
what is needed to carry out the stated or construed terms of a trust.30
And here is what the Commissioners have to say: “A court may
reduce the amount of property transferred [for a purpose], if it de-
termines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount re-
quired for the intended use.”31 To which principle do they mean to
advert? The reference to the sum required for the intended use
seems to contemplate the traditional resulting trust scenario of su-
perfluous funding. But the reference to substantial excess seems an
allusion to bequests for purposes too lavishly funded to satisfy the
dictates of public policy. Such an approach would certainly comport
with the Commissioners’ modern impulse to cure flawed estate
plans, giving effect to testamentary intent so far as that is possible.32
Yet their language will admit of either interpretation, and the ac-
companying comment fails to clarify which situation they had in
mind—assuming they had anything clearly in mind.33 If in fact the
                                                                                                                      
8A:4-7 (West 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11(3)(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998); see also N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.5 (McKinney 1992) (affirming the existing power of
courts to determine reasonability, without expressly granting authority to reduce bequests);
OR. REV. STAT. § 97.730 (1990) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-904(b)(1) (Michie 1991)
(fixing a monetary limit on these bequests without expressly granting courts authority to
reduce excessive ones); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(a) (1991 & Supp. 1998)
(same).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 430-32 (1959). For cases in which courts
reduced excessive bequests for noncharitable purposes where they appeared a product of
changed circumstances or mistaken overallocation, or where construed as intending smaller
allocations than literally stated in the will, see Clark v. Portland Burying Ground Ass’n, 200
A.2d 468, 471-73 (Conn. 1964); Security Trust Co. v. Willett, 97 A.2d 112, 112-13 (Del. Ch.
1953); In re Backes’ Will, 30 N.Y.S. 394, 395-96 (Sur. Ct. 1894); In re Boardman, 20 N.Y.S.
60, 61-62 (Sur. Ct. 1891); Emans v. Hickman, 19 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 425, 426-28 (1877); In re
Gorey’s Will, 170 N.Y.S. 635, 635-36 (Sur. Ct. 1918); In re Turk’s Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225, 235-
36, 239-40 (Sur. Ct. 1927), appeal denied, 226 N.Y.S. 111 (App. Div. 1927); In re Welch, 172
N.Y.S. 349, 350-51 (Sur. Ct. 1918); In re Young’s Estate, 157 N.Y.S. 494, 495-96 (Sur. Ct.
1915); Convey Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 612, 613-14 (Orphans’ Ct. 1950); Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D.
& C.2d 474, 481-83 (Orphans’ Ct. 1974); Wood Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 577, 578-79 (Or-
phans’ Ct. 1957); cf. Hammond v. Stinger, 258 S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Ark. 1953) (finding insuffi-
cient proof of overallocation to warrant a resulting trust); Earney v. Clay, 516 S.W.2d 59,
67-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (same).
31. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6) (amended 1993). Prior to the technical amend-
ments of 1993, this provision had applied only to trusts for pets. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
2-907(b)(8) (9th ed. 1991); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE app. X, § 2-907(b)(8) (amended
1993) (technical amendments).
32. Surely we can surmise that a testator would prefer that a reasonable sum go for a
purpose in lieu of an unreasonable sum. For other rules within the Code serving to revise
defective wills, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1993) (advocating correction of
mistakes of formalization); id § 2-903 (advocating correction of mistaken violations of the
Rule Against Perpetuities).
33. No discussion of this language by a Commissioner is to be found either in a pub-
lished document or within the Commissioners’ unpublished archives. But very similar lan-
guage appeared in the preliminary proposal for a trust-for-pets section, made by a non-
commissioner, and was later grafted into the optional section, whether thoughtfully or no.
To that preliminary proposal there was attached the following note: “The only possible pub-
lic misapprehension of such a statute would be on the basis of the anecdotal, sometimes
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Commissioners did by this provision intend to speak to the problem
of extravagant funding, codifying the Restatement rule as to sub-
stance34 but supplementing it with a remedy, then their decision to
ignore the other substantive dimension of trusts contrary to public
policy seems all the more arbitrary: Why should the code define the
quantitative, but not the qualitative, attributes of this (ineffective)
variety of trust?
The one construct dealt with expressly and directly by the op-
tional section is the intermediate category of noncharitable purpose
trust. This the optional section acknowledges as valid.35 Particularly
auspicious is the scope of that acknowledgment. Here, we must again
preface the discussion with a bit more background. Before the Re-
statement of Trusts was first promulgated in 1935, the leading
authority on the effectiveness of noncharitable purpose trusts was a
British case, Morice v. Bishop of Durham,36 where Sir William
Grant, as Master of the Rolls, put forward the view—later dubbed
the “beneficiary principle”—that a trust was void unless some party
had standing to enforce its terms against the trustee. On this basis,
he struck down a trust for indefinite noncharitable purposes to be
chosen by the trustee, lacking direct beneficiaries with the authority
to sue the trustee for breach of trust.37 However hallowed, Grant’s
opinion was philosophically hollow—for the same lawmakers who
require a trust to be enforceable by somebody in order to subsist also
decide just which somebodies are (and aren’t) invested with that
authority. If a trust is void for want of an enforcer, that is true be-
                                                                                                                      
sensational, instances of a disposition that is far too large for the purpose. It is necessary to
give the power . . . to cut these back in extreme cases.” Rees Proposal, supra note 13. This
suggests the notion of exorbitance rather than superfluity, though we cannot be confident
that anyone thought about this distinction when the language was copied into the Code.
The discussion draft of the revised Uniform Trust Act includes provisions clearly confined to
the problem of superfluous funding. See UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 406(c) cmt., 407(3) (Discussion
Draft, Feb. 9, 1999).
34. Cases (though few of recent vintage) in several jurisdictions have given effect to
extravagant trusts for noncharitable purposes in spite of the Restatement rule. See Clark v.
Portland Burying Ground Ass’n, 200 A.2d 468, 470 (Conn. 1964) (dicta); Snouffer v. Peoples
Trust & Sav. Co., 212 N.E.2d 165, 171-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965); Morrow v. Durant, 118 N.W.
781, 784 (Iowa 1908); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 352-53 (1883); In re Getman’s
Will, 291 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397, 401 (App. Div. 1968); In re Baeuchle’s Will, 82 N.Y.S.2d 371, 377
(Sur. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1950), aff’d mem., 93 N.E.2d 491 (1950); In re Board-
man, 20 N.Y.S. 60, 61 (Sur. Ct. 1891) (dicta); Emans v. Hickman, 19 N.Y Sup. Ct. 425, 427
(1877) (dicta); Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 372 (Orphans’ Ct. 1974) (dicta); Kal-
bach’s Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C. 195, 198 (Orphans’ Ct. 1927); Estate of Smith, 181 Pa. 109,
114-15 (1896); Bainbridge’s Appeal, 97 Pa. 483, 486 (1881); see also Mellick v. President and
Guardians of the Asylum, 37 Eng. Rep. 818, 820 (M.R. 1821) (English law). Enactment of
the optional section in these states would, by hypothesis, function to preempt this case law.
35. In Great Britain, by contrast, the validity of noncharitable purpose trusts is thor-
oughly unclear. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 35-40.
36. 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (M.R. 1804), aff’d, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805).
37. See id. at 658.
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cause lawmakers have declined to pick one out, not because of the
inexorable logic of the beneficiary principle.38 At any rate, Morice did
refuse to give effect to the trust at issue, and the case was subse-
quently cited by a number of pre-Restatement American courts for
the proposition that trusts for noncharitable purposes, both definite
and indefinite, were ineffective.39
When the first Restatement of Trusts appeared, it formally reaf-
firmed the beneficiary principle40 but got round it by reforming
trusts for definite noncharitable purposes into honorary trusts (akin
to powers), immune from Grant’s edict:41 Since a power is not specifi-
cally enforceable it requires no beneficiary with standing to enforce
its terms. On the other hand, the first Restatement continued to fol-
low the narrow holding of Morice, deeming trusts for indefinite non-
charitable purposes void per se.42 Why the Restators chose this
course can only be guessed: Scott knew full well that the public poli-
cies underlying the two cases were identical,43 and he could have cir-
cumvented the beneficiary principle in the second instance in the
self-same manner as he had in the first. Possibly Scott was moti-
vated by a tactical desire to avoid where possible the holding in
Morice without presuming to overrule so celebrated an opinion.44 The
result was a doctrinal inconsistency,45 which Scott left in place until
1957, when he tweaked the Restatement (Second) to extend the re-
medial apparatus applicable to trusts for definite noncharitable pur-
poses also to those for indefinite ones.46 Alas, this relatively late re-
form has not gained acceptance with anything approaching the mod-
                                                                                                                      
38. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 91-94.
39. The pre-Restatement courts established no general rule on point, however. For a
discussion of the early case law, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 41-44.
40. As did its successor. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 112 (1935); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (1959).
41. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 (1935).
42. See id. § 123 & cmt. c.
43. See Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (pts. 1 & 2), 65 U. PA. L. REV.
527, 540-41 (1917); AUSTIN W. SCOTT, EXPLANATORY NOTES ON TRUSTS 30 (American Law
Institute, prepared in connection with RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1930)).
44. The phenomenon of lawmakers chipping inconsistent exceptions off of, rather than
overturning outright, rules perceived to be generally unsound has a long history in the
common law. The resulting distinctions, motivated merely by tactical considerations, tend
to be transient, foreshadowing the rules’ eventual demise, which then also obliterates the
inconsistencies (as, indeed, proved to be the sequence of events here). For a jurisprudential
discussion, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 70-74, 105-18,
136-40 (1988).
45. I am not the first to have noticed it. See George E. Palmer, The Effect of Indefinite-
ness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers of Appointment, 10 UCLA. L. REV. 241, 277
(1963).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 123, 124 (1959).
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ern judicial consensus on trusts for definite noncharitable purposes;47
and in light of the Restators’ flip-flop, the law applicable to indefinite
noncharitable purposes in jurisdictions lacking post-Restatement
(Second) precedents remains distressingly uncertain.
Enter the Commissioners. Drafting against this historical back-
drop, their original, 1990 version of the optional section was a disap-
pointment: The section covered only a trust “for a lawful nonchari-
table purpose,” apparently excluding from the purview of the Code
trusts not designated for a particular purpose.48 Fortunately, the
Technical Amendments of 1993 scrapped this limitation, and the op-
tional section now gives effect to trusts for noncharitable purposes,
be those purposes “specific” or ones “to be selected by the trustee.”49
Hence, the Code now mirrors the Restatement in affirmatively
treating both sorts of trusts symmetrically.50
In this respect, ironically, the Commissioners have run the same
course as the Restators, though in a much compressed span. But the
amended optional section’s merger of definite and indefinite pur-
poses is especially propitious, for it comes within a code. Hence, un-
like the Restatement (Second), it serves unequivocally to overrule ill-
considered and uncertain case law on point.
                                                                                                                      
47. For cases giving effect to honorary trusts for definite noncharitable purposes, see
Hirsch, supra note 2, at 48 n.62; the most recent decision on point is Phillips v. Estate of
Holzmann, No. 98-765, 1998 WL 889239 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 25, 1998). By contrast, case law
on the validity of honorary trusts for indefinite noncharitable purposes is today more or less
evenly divided. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 48 n.62.
48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (9th ed. 1991); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE app.
X, § 2-907(a) (amended 1993) (technical amendments).
49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993). The discussion draft of the Uni-
form Trust Act now follows suit (earlier drafts having neglected to address the matter). See
UNIF. TRUST ACT § 407(1) & cmt. (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999); cf. UNIF. TRUST ACT § 2-
105(b) (Discussion Draft, Oct. 13, 1997).
50. Trusts for indefinite noncharitable purposes are made effective expressly by stat-
ute in two non-Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15204 (West
1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.004(2) (Michie 1993); see also MONTANA CODE ANN. § 72-
33-205 (1997) (additional validating statute in a jurisdiction that also adopted the optional
section, see supra note 13). Another curiosity in the 1990 version of the optional section was
language indicating that it applied not only to intended trusts for noncharitable purposes
but also to trusts “for a noncharitable corporation or unincorporated society.” UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (9th ed. 1991). These apparently were to be treated as honorary
trusts, rather than as enforceable ones, as they had always been under the Restatement.
Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 119 (1959). The technical amend-
ments struck this reference to corporations and societies from the optional section. See
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993); id. app. X, § 2-907(a) (technical amend-
ments); see also Executive Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Technical Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code Article II (Feb. 6,
1993), at 106-07 (“Explanation of Technical Amendments”) (admitting vaguely that “[t]he
original description of an honorary trust was too broad”) (unpublished document, on file
with author) [hereinafter Technical Amendments].
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III.   PROCESS
The optional section also speaks—although none too fluently—to
the process of purpose trusts. Having restricted themselves to non-
charitable purpose trusts and having pronounced them to be effec-
tive, the Commissioners went on to draft a blueprint for their inter-
nal machinery. Is the legal vehicle they have contrived well engi-
neered?
The optional section first purports to distinguish two different
sorts of purpose trust on the basis of substantive disposition. A trust
for the performance of a “noncharitable purpose” in general is desig-
nated an “[h]onorary [t]rust.” This sort of trust “may be performed by
the trustee.”51 A trust for the care of a domestic or pet animal in par-
ticular comes under the separate heading of a “[t]rust for [p]ets.”
Such a trust “is valid.”52 That this second sort of trust is meant to dif-
fer from the first, as an enforceable instrument, seems underscored
by the rule of construction that follows. In determining testamentary
intent with respect to provisions for an animal, the bequest “must be
liberally construed to bring the transfer within this subsection.”53
Courts begin with a rebuttable presumption that the testator in-
tended a trust, rather than a “merely precatory or honorary . . . dis-
position.”54
And so, at first sight, it appears the Commissioners mean to cod-
ify the Restatement with one exception,55 treating intended trusts for
                                                                                                                      
51. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993).
52. Id. § 2-907(b); see also infra note 127 (discussing the boundaries of this category).
53. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993).
54. Id. The discussion draft of the Uniform Trust Act includes an equivalent rule of
construction. See UNIF. TRUST ACT § 406(a) (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). The reference
to liberal construction indicates that the plain meaning rule will not apply here. The op-
tional section goes on to state that extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish testamen-
tary intent in this regard. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993). The notes
accompanying the preliminary proposal for this phrasing state that it is intended to “antici-
pate and cure the in-artful language that will certainly be used in many cases. A gift might
be made ‘to’ the animal, or to the new owner of the animal without further explanation.”
Rees Proposal, supra note 13. I would certainly concur in the waiver of the plain meaning
rule in these cases—and, indeed, in all cases, given its fundamental want of soundness. See
Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1115-25. Whether a presumption ought to exist in favor of con-
struing bequests for pet-care as trusts, however, is doubtful: The alternative estate plan,
whereby a testator bequeaths the pet itself to a caretaker in whom she has confidence and
then (if necessary) makes a bequest of funds outright to that person, informally understood
to be for the pet’s care, has going for it the simple virtue of common sense. That may well be
what a testator has in mind by an ambiguously worded bequest. See Estate of Russell, 444
P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968); see also supra note 1 (estate planning discussions).
55. A different exception to the common law has gained far more pervasive adoption
under state statutes: That is the special process rules that often apply to trusts for the up-
keep of a cemetery lot. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 107-08; infra note 134. The Uniform
Probate Code makes no separate provision for those, however. The matter was raised dur-
ing the plenary reading of the optional section prior to its enactment in 1990. A Commis-
sioner enquired whether the optional section overrode special rules regarding trusts for the
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noncharitable purposes as honorary trusts unless they pertain to the
care of a pet.56 Yet, further inspection reveals that the administrative
provisions of the optional section do not in fact function to distin-
guish “honorary trust” process from “trust for pets” process. A final
subsection sets out the rules of trust administration under the op-
tional section—yet it explicitly applies, without distinction, to both
sorts of trusts differentiated in the preceding subsections.57 Under
this last subsection, if a trustee declines to carry out the purpose
designated in the bequest, the court can replace her.58 What is more,
a testator has the authority to name an individual with standing to
enforce the intended purpose of the bequest upon the trustee.59 And
so, quite to our surprise, we discover that under this subsection
                                                                                                                      
care of graves. The Reporter for the revised Article II, Lawrence Waggoner, replied that it
did not: These would continue to be treated under separate state statutes. See National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of the
Whole, Uniform Probate Code Article II (July 15, 1990), at 135 (unpublished document, on
file with author) [hereinafter Plenary Reading]. No thought seems to have been given to the
possibility of establishing a uniform rule on point, despite the fact that the prevailing body
of state legislation is quite a hodgepodge—and in some cases poorly drafted. See Hirsch, su-
pra note 2, at 107-08 & n.289. Nor was the relation of the optional section to preexisting
state statutes covering cemetery trusts remarked and clarified in the accompanying com-
ment. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). The discussion draft of the
Uniform Trust Act also leaves the issue of trusts for the care of graves to state law, but at
least it does so explicitly. See UNIF. TRUST ACT § 407 cmt. (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999).
56. To single out bequests for the care of an animal for special process consideration
would break new ground. The Commissioners briefly justify their novel provision for animal
care as “meet[ing] a concern of many pet owners by providing them a means for leaving
funds to be used for the pet’s care.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). One
cannot but wonder whether the emphasis on pets stemmed in part from the fact that the
Commissioners had received a thoughtful proposal on the subject and hence were prompted
to give it consideration. See Rees Proposal, supra note 13 (observing, inter alia, that
“[d]uring life, the animal owner needs to have the simple assurance of knowing that he will
have fulfilled his obligation to the animal in the event of the owner’s death”).
57. “[A] trust covered by either of those subsections is subject to the following provi-
sions. . . .” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c) (amended 1993).
58. “A court may order the transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to
assure that the intended purpose is carried out.” Id. § 2-907(c)(7).
59. See id. § 2-907(c)(4). Under this subsection, if the testator fails to designate an en-
forcer, one can be “appointed by a court upon application to it by an individual.” Id. A curi-
ous limitation: The court apparently lacks authority to appoint an enforcer sua sponte. But,
whether or not such an appointment is made, the court can act under another subsection to
transfer the corpus to a different trustee if the original trustee fails to carry out the testa-
tor’s purpose. See supra note 58. Does this imply that the court itself must undertake to
monitor the trust if no enforcer is designated and no application to appoint one is made? See
also infra note 80. Conceivably, the court’s power to appoint an enforcer sua sponte could
still be derived from the court’s general power to “make such other orders and determina-
tions as shall be advisable to carry out the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this
section.” Id. § 2-907(c)(7). Another shortcoming of the instant subsection is its failure to
spell out the enforcer’s status (that is, as an officer of the court) and her liability in the
event of negligent or faithless performance of her duties as trust monitor. Do the guards not
have to be guarded? This subsection is slightly modified in Colorado. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-901(3)(d) (1998); see also UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 406(b) & cmt., 407(2) (Discussion
Draft, Feb. 9, 1999) (making further improvements); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 105 n.272
(suggesting a guardianship analogy).
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trusts for all noncharitable purposes become effectively subject to
specific performance. But why then did the earlier subsections char-
acterize trusts for a general noncharitable purpose as “merely . . .
honorary,” which the trustee “may . . . perform[ ]”?60
The key to the puzzle lies in the history. Under the original, 1990
version of optional section, the process rules which operated to make
trusts for purposes enforceable applied only to those for the care of a
pet.61 The Commissioners elected to extend those process rules to
trusts for general noncharitable purposes under the technical
amendments of 1993—but they did so without making any accompa-
nying change in the language of the prior subsection giving effect to
purpose trusts as honorary, rather than as full-fledged, trusts.
Surely, this must have been an oversight62 (and, as we shall see, it
was not the only one). But the upshot is that, as presently composed,
the optional section has become self-contradictory.63
                                                                                                                      
60. See supra notes 51, 54 and accompanying text.
61. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (9th ed. 1991); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE,
app. X, § 2-907(b) (amended 1993) (technical amendments). This original scheme of distin-
guishing unenforceable trusts for general noncharitable purposes from enforceable ones for
the care of pets was adopted by two non-Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions which none-
theless borrowed for their statutes parts of the language set out in the 1990 version of the
optional section. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-145, 36A-147 (1995) (construed in Ronald C.
Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV.
1783, 1805-07, 1836-37 (1996)); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1 (McKinney 1992 &
Supp. 1999) (rendering trusts for pets enforceable without covering bequests for general
noncharitable purposes).
62. It is not absolutely clear, however, that the drafters of the technical amendments
recognized all of the implications of their revisions. The amended comment accompanying
the amended optional section contains not a word about this seemingly significant change.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). To the National Conference of
Commissioners, all the drafters of the technical amendments reported was this: “Several of
the provisions previously applicable only to trusts for pets are equally appropriate for hon-
orary trusts, and the amendments extend those provisions to honorary trusts.” Technical
Amendments, supra note 50, at 106-07 (“Explanation of Technical Amendments”). Given the
import of those “several . . . provisions,” which relate, as we have observed in the text, to en-
forceability, continuing to speak of them as applying to “honorary trusts” appears at best
anachronistic, and at worst a contradiction-in-terms: Once the provisions are extended, the
trusts they govern are “honorary” no longer. See also infra note 68.
63. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999) (effective Apr.
1, 2000) (omitting the label “honorary trust,” but otherwise reproducing the confusing lan-
guage of the optional section, quoted supra in text at notes 51-54). By contrast, the discus-
sion draft of the Uniform Trust Act expressly deems both a trust for a general noncharitable
purpose and a trust for the care of a pet as “valid and enforceable and not dependent on the
trustee deciding on whether to honor the settlor’s wishes.” UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 406(a) &
cmt., 407(1) & cmt. (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). Meanwhile, the tentative draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts follows the prior Restatement in deeming a trust for definite
or indefinite noncharitable purposes as subject to a “power but not a duty” to carry out the
purpose. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(1), (2) & cmts. a, c, & d (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 10, 1999). Though recognizing the possibility of bestowing “fully enforceable
trust status” on these bequests, the Restators prefer “a cautious approach,” leaving “more
aggressive development of the law to the enactment of legislation.” Id. § 47 reporter’s notes,
at 256.
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Assuming, at any rate, that the last subsection controls, trusts for
noncharitable purposes under the revised Uniform Probate Code
have become honorary in name only. In this respect, the Commis-
sioners smuggled a substantive amendment into their technical
amendments. Viewed on the merits, this change represents a great
leap forward: No substantive justification for rendering nonchari-
table purpose trusts unenforceable against the trustee, as they are
under the Restatement, has ever been presented by a court or
scholar; nor does one present itself now.64 On the contrary, allowing
the testator to create an enforceable noncharitable purpose trust af-
firmatively furthers public policy by preventing trustees from col-
luding with alternative beneficiaries to terminate their trusts in ex-
change for a portion of the proceeds.65 But the Commissioners failed
to go the distance by scrapping the old label and identifying trusts
for noncharitable purpose as garden-variety trusts. That failure has
the ill consequence of leaving “honorary trusts” for noncharitable
purposes—as they were, and remain, under the Restatement—a
muddled category, somewhere in between trust and power.66
Whether the subsidiary principles of trust law or powers doctrine
apply had never been clear under the common law67—and remains
                                                                                                                      
64. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts offers no express justification for its caution. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 reporter’s notes, at 256-58 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 10, 1999).
65. For a fuller discussion of the public policy of enforceability of noncharitable pur-
pose trusts, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 94-97. A number of foreign jurisdictions (for exam-
ple, the Isle of Jersey) now also offer testators the power to create enforceable trusts for
noncharitable purposes. See Simon Gould, Jersey and Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts: The
Product of an Evolutionary Process?, 5 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 87 (1996). This may also
be the rule in Kentucky. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.260(1) (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996)
(for a case interpreting this statute, see Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739 (Ky. 1923)). But
several American jurisdictions treating noncharitable purpose trusts by statute, together
with Canadian provinces acknowledging their validity, have instead codified the Restate-
ment process rule whereby intended trusts for noncharitable purposes become powers, not
specifically enforceable. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15204, 15211, 15212 (West 1991 & Supp.
1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.055 (West 1992) (covering trusts for specific noncharitable
purposes only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-118 (1996) (covering trusts for the care of pets
only); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998) (covering trusts for specific
noncharitable purposes only); see also the North Carolina statutes cited supra note 61, and
the Canadian statutes cited infra note 112.
66. According to the Restatement, “it is more accurate to state the [honorary] trustee
has a power than it is to state that he holds upon trust,” but the Restatement does not iden-
tify an honorary trust as a power per se. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c
(1959).
67. For a discussion of the extant case law, further arguing as a matter of public policy
that the subsidiary rules of trust law should apply to honorary trusts, see Hirsch, supra
note 2, at 98-101. The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts is more strongly
suggestive, although not quite definitive. It refers to a noncharitable purpose trust as “a
special form of . . . trust,” in which “the devisee holds the property in trust, upon terms
adapted by operation of law. That adapted trust is for the testator’s residuary beneficiaries
or heirs but subject to the devisee’s power (with no duty) to . . . make distributions for . . .
the . . . intended purposes.” Hence, the devisee becomes “a trustee-power holder.”
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unsettled under the Code,68 although one adopting state has taken
the bull by the horns and resolved this ambiguity on its own.69
Only in two particulars does the optional section help to resolve
this cluster of issues, one serviceably, the other less so. Under the
optional section, if a trustee of a purpose trust is not named, or is
unwilling or unable initially or subsequently to serve, the court may
(barring an expression of testamentary intent to the contrary) ap-
point one, or one’s successor.70 In this important respect, “honorary
                                                                                                                      
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmts. a, c, & f (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 10, 1999).
Either the personal representative or a successor in interest can sue “to prevent or redress
a breach of trust.” Id. cmt. f. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts would profit by an express
statement that, except as explicitly modified, the subsidiary rules of trust law apply to non-
charitable purpose trusts.
68. This is true even of the special category of “trusts for pets,” which is not clearly
identified as coming under the trust rubric in all respects. Whereas the optional section con-
tinues to characterize trusts for general noncharitable purposes as honorary trusts, trusts
for pets are referred to in the accompanying comment as “a particular type of honorary
trust.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). Nor do other sections of the Uni-
form Probate Code and the separate uniform acts dealing with trust law resolve the ques-
tion at the receiving end: Invariably these other sections and acts refer to trusts alone,
never to honorary trusts. See UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT (1991), 8B
U.L.A. 455 (1993 & Supp. 1997); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (1962), 7B U.L.A. 150
(1985 & Supp. 1997); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994), 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1997);
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(53) (amended 1993) (definitional section, failing to clarify
whether an honorary trust falls within the definition of a trust under the Code); id. § 2-511.
The discussion draft of the Uniform Trust Act is clearer, distinguishing “the trusts created
by this . . . section” from “unenforceable powers of appointment,” although—like the Uni-
form Probate Code—it continues to identify trusts for noncharitable purposes as “so-called
honorary trusts.” UNIF. TRUST ACT § 406 cmt. (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). Again, an
express statement that the subsidiary rules of trust law apply to noncharitable purpose
trusts is advisable.
69. Three cheers for Colorado, which adopted the optional section but modified it in
language that other enacting states would do well to emulate: “All trusts created under this
section shall be registered and all trustees shall be subject to the laws of this state applying
to trusts and trustees.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-901(3)(e) (1998).
70. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(7) (amended 1993). Compare the tentative
draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which, barring an expression of intent in the will,
presumes that the trustee’s office is personal to a trustee named in the will where the trust
is for indefinite noncharitable purposes, but draws the opposite presumption where the
trust is for a definite noncharitable purpose, in which case “if the designated trustee effec-
tively refuses the power or resigns or dies before its expiration, a successor trustee may be
appointed by the court.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No.
2, Mar. 10, 1999). (Will the as-yet-undrafted sections of the Restatement (Third) covering
trusts for definite and indefinite charitable purposes draw an analogous distinction? The
Restatement (Second) quite explicitly does not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §
397 & cmts. a & b (1959).) One assumes—although the point needs to be clarified—that un-
der the Restatement (Third), if a court either expressly or by presumption has authority to
replace the trustee of a noncharitable purpose trust, it will not do so if the trustee’s decision
to resign stems from her unwillingness to carry out the designated purpose. Otherwise,
trusts for noncharitable purposes would be rendered effectively enforceable under the Re-
statement (Third), a result which it explicitly disavows. See supra note 63; cf. 2 SCOTT, su-
pra note 20, § 124, at 247 (arguing that courts should have authority to replace an honorary
trustee who dies but not one who “refuses to exercise the power,” because that would
amount to “indirect enforcement of the power, and it can hardly be maintained that if it is
unenforceable directly it can be enforced indirectly”).
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trusts” under the Uniform Probate Code follow the law of trusts
rather than powers.71 But in another important respect the Commis-
sioners saw fit to deviate from trust law: The optional section pro-
vides that “no . . . periodic accounting, separate maintenance of
funds, . . . or fee is required by reason of the existence of the fiduci-
ary relationship of the trustee.”72 This provision is significant in that
it seems to take for granted—although it fails to aver—“the exis-
tence”73 of fiduciary responsibilities. Thus, the provision could be
read to mean that trust fiduciary law does apply otherwise to trusts
for noncharitable purposes, an outcome that the common law had
never clarified.74 Assuming that is what they meant, one wishes the
Commissioners had announced the principle, instead of implying it
en passant.
That aside, the virtues of the exceptions carved out of trust fidu-
ciary law in this subsection are, to say the least, mysterious. Be-
cause, like a standard trust, a trust for a purpose can implicate ex-
tended managerial duties, fees would seem in order in the ordinary
course.75 So would the traditional duties to segregate trust assets and
periodically to account for them. Whoever has the task of monitoring
a purpose trust, assuming such a person is named,76 needs to deter-
mine whether the trustee is fulfilling her responsibilities, no less
than the beneficiaries of a trust for persons do. The removal of these
fiduciary duties can only heighten information costs and, as a conse-
quence, agency costs.77
Yet again, the (disquieting) solution to the mystery emerges from
the history. Recall that all of the special process rules relating to
purpose trusts under the optional section originally applied—and
                                                                                                                      
71. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 11.2
cmt. b, 14 introductory note, 14.2 & cmts., 14.5 (1983) (powers doctrine), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 33 & cmt. a, 101 & cmts., 196 & cmt. a (1959) (trust doctrine).
72. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(5) (amended 1993). These presumptions yield to
an expression of contrary intent or to an order by the court. See id. In Colorado, this subsec-
tion was not enacted but was replaced by the language quoted supra note 69.
73. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(5) (amended 1993).
74. But compare the notes accompanying this same language in the preliminary pro-
posal for a trust-for-pets section, quoted infra in text at note 79.
75. By analogy, trustees of trusts for charitable purposes receive fees under ordinary
trust law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 390 & cmt. (1959).
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. Once again, by analogy, the Restatement mandates that trustees of trusts for chari-
table purposes bear the standard litany of fiduciary duties, including segregation of assets
and periodic accounting. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 & cmt. a (1959); see
also id. §§ 172, 179 (mandating these duties with respect to trusts for persons). Historically,
however, many states required no periodic reports from charitable trustees to the attorney
general. But the Commissioners themselves have recognized that such accounting is “vitally
needed,” and they produced a uniform act achieving this result. See UNIF. SUPERVISION OF
TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACT, 7B U.L.A. 727 & prefatory note (1954).
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were crafted to apply—only to trusts for the care of pets.78 In that
limited context, an exception from the strict rules of trust fiduciary
law might appear to make sense. The preliminary proposal for the
trust-for-pets section, suggesting language virtually identical to that
which came to appear in the optional section concerning fiduciary
law, reasoned:
It is important that all the results be accomplished in as low-key
and unobtrusive a way as possible. Hence [this] subsection . . . ex-
cuses the trappings and expenses of trustee relationships. The en-
tire draft statute goes out of its way to avoid the language in-
volved in the creation of formal trusts and does not invoke the ap-
plication of the whole body of trust law and fiduciary obligations.79
That is all well enough, perhaps, in respect of small sums allocated
for sustaining cats and dogs—but it is plainly inappropriate for more
substantial endowments set aside for other noncharitable causes.
The rationale for the subsection collapses under the weight of its ex-
panded coverage, accomplished via the technical amendments.80
Troublingly, it appears that the Commissioners promulgated those
amendments not only without regard to the inconsistencies of lan-
guage they created,81 but also heedless to the suitability of the old
process rules to handle trusts for purposes which, however similar
                                                                                                                      
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. Rees Proposal, supra note 13.
80. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Another subsection that collapses
along with it is the one permitting a court to appoint an enforcer for a noncharitable pur-
pose trust if the testator neglects to name one, but only “upon application to it by an indi-
vidual.” See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(4) (amended 1993); see also supra note 59. The
language of this subsection derives from the preliminary proposal for a trusts-for-pets sec-
tion. See Rees Proposal, supra note 13. The notes accompanying that proposal state:
The intended result of [this] subsection . . . is exactly analogous to that of the
guardian ad litem for a minor or a disabled beneficiary. I believe that in most ju-
risdictions no guardian has to be appointed . . . but any person may apply to be
appointed if there appears to be a problem. Similarly, under the draft statute, if
one thinks the animal is not getting the benefit of the gift, he may apply or per-
suade another to apply. . . . But no person is required to be appointed, either ini-
tially or upon application.
Id. Once again, it is manifest that the proposal contemplated bequests of small sums for the
care of pets whose condition might be observed by sympathetic others. And, once again, this
subsection originally applied only to such bequests, but was expanded by the technical
amendments to cover bequests for all noncharitable purposes, including large gifts for ab-
stract social causes, whose diffuse and indirect “beneficiaries"—the only persons with any
reason to petition a court for appointment of an enforcer—may have heavily diluted merce-
nary incentives and huge information costs. For a related discussion, see Hirsch, supra note
2, at 105-06 (addressing whether indirect beneficiaries should have personal standing to en-
force purpose trusts). In such cases, if not in all cases, the language of the section should di-
rect the court to appoint an enforcer sua sponte if the testator neglects to do so.
81. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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structurally, could differ dramatically in their financial order of
magnitude.82
IV.   DURATION OF TRUSTS
Finally, we come to the matter of the permissible longevity of
trusts for purposes: For how long can a testator dictate that such a
trust will persist? The rules which we must here unpack appear
within two separate uniform acts: the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, now grafted onto the revised Uniform Probate
Code83 but adopted widely on its own,84 and the optional section of
the Code devoted exclusively to purpose trusts, which has gained
adoption (thus far) only in a handful of states.85
In the absence of these acts, the principles of law that govern are
moderately clear, though by no means wholly resolved. John Chip-
man Gray once crowed that perpetuities doctrine was “concatenated
with almost mathematical precision,”86 but around even this field one
can discern a penumbra; and the life of perpetuities law appears
least logical when we come to explore purpose trusts.
Contributing to the confusion is the fact that, strictly speaking,
the Rule Against Perpetuities seems to have no bearing on trusts for
definite purposes at all. What the Rule requires is that an interest
become vested—a manner of speaking, by which we mean not subject
to a condition precedent—within the allotted period of some life in
being plus twenty-one years.87 Bequests that might vest remotely,
possibly remaining saddled with contingencies after the period has
elapsed, are void ab initio. But so long as a testator attaches no con-
tingency to a trust for a definite purpose, it “is as vested as anything
                                                                                                                      
82. But compare the assertion of the drafters of the technical amendments, quoted su-
pra note 62.
83. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to -906 (amended 1993).
84. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (promulgated in 1986 and
amended in 1990) is today in force in twenty-five states. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8B U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1201 (Supp.
1998). It has been adopted without the optional section of the Uniform Probate Code in fif-
teen states, although one of these (New Jersey) may be about to repeal the Uniform Statu-
tory Rule, see infra note 134, and two other of these (California and Tennessee) regulate the
duration of trusts for noncharitable purposes by other statutes (in the case of Tennessee,
only trusts for pets are otherwise regulated), see infra notes 126, 128. In a sixteenth state
(Michigan), the Uniform Statutory Rule will prevail on its own until April 1, 2000, when the
optional section becomes effective. See supra note 13.
85. See supra note 13.
86. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 869, at 757 (Roland Gray ed.,
4th ed. 1942) (1886).
87. See J.H.C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 1-2 (2d
ed. 1962). Hence, the Rule Against Perpetuities “is not a rule invalidating interests which
last too long.” Id. at 2.
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can be.”88 For this reason, a testator can direct that a trust for a defi-
nite charitable purpose will continue forever—such a direction is
perfectly valid under the Rule.89 But, in fact, she can provide that a
trust for indefinite charitable purposes will also continue forever:
Though the beneficial interest is now contingent upon the trustee’s
choice of which charity to subsidize at any one time, so long as the
occurrence of a condition merely shifts the interest from one charity
to another, the trust remains valid irrespective of when the contin-
gency is due to be resolved—this, under a special exception to the
Rule Against Perpetuities.90
By the same token, logic suggests, perpetual trusts for definite
noncharitable purposes should be valid per se, as creating vested in-
terests. Yet, the case law is quite clear that they are not. Courts
unanimously require trusts for definite noncharitable purposes to
terminate (rather than vest) within some life in being and twenty-
one years.91 From this, Professors Leach, Simes, Gulliver, Fratcher
                                                                                                                      
88. Charles Sweet, Restraints on Alienation (pt.2), 33 L.Q. REV. 342, 361-62 (1917); see
also WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES § 13.7, at 548-49
(1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.6 cmt. a, § 2.1
cmt. f (1983); George L. Clark, Unenforcible [sic] Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
10 MICH. L. REV. 31, 35 (1911); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1704 (1985); In re Estate of McNeill, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141 (Ct. App.
1964); Snouffer v. Peoples Trust and Sav. Co., 212 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965); In
re Estate of Woods, 311 P.2d 359, 369 (Kan. 1957); Devereux’s Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491,
504 (Orphans’ Ct. 1943), appeal quashed, 46 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1946); In re Cain, 1950 V.L.R.
382, 391 (Vict.). But see Barton v. Parrott, 495 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1984) (as-
serting without analysis that though the interest in a charitable trust is vested, the interest
in a noncharitable purpose trust is not).
89. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 185-86; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 398
(1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 & cmt. f (1983);
supra note 3. The historical origins of the perpetual charitable trust have not been explored
by legal historians. Professor Keeton asserted that its legal authorization traced to the
English ecclesiastical courts sometime during the medieval period, and that surmise is al-
most certainly correct. See GEORGE W. KEETON, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES 1 (1962);
see generally A.J. McClean, Charitable Trusts, the Rule Against Perpetuities, Accumulation
and Cy-Près, 1 U.B.C. L. REV. 729 (1963). Scholars heretofore have identified only nine-
teenth-century precedents, although one involved a 1585 trust that “has been used now for
nearly three centuries for charitable purposes.” Attorney General v. Webster, 20 Eq. 483,
489-90 (1875) (M.R.). I have discovered a far earlier case (involving, however, a later trust)
in which a court held a perpetual charitable trust valid without analysis. See In re Stoddard
(App. 1622), reprinted in GEORGE DUKE, THE LAW OF CHARITABLE USES 81 (London 1676);
see also id. 105-12. Probably the longest lasting charitable trust in the United States was
the one endowed by the estate of Benjamin Franklin. It terminated in 1990, after a term of
two hundred years, as Franklin’s will provided. See Fox Butterfield, From Ben Franklin, A
Gift That’s Worth Two Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1990, at A1. According to Professor
Holdsworth, some charitable trusts founded in England in the sixteenth century have en-
dured into the twentieth. See 7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (2d
ed. 1937).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.6 & cmt. d
(1983).
91. There is an Everest of such cases. See, e.g., Foshee v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 617
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1981). For a tabulation of many of them, see LEWIS M. SIMES &
ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1394 n.24 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1998).
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and Kales all deduced that noncharitable purpose trusts are subject
to a second, (unnamed)92 rule, shadowing the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, though not identical to it.93 The Restators pay implicit homage
to this view. Carefully, they refer to noncharitable purpose trusts as
constrained by the “period” of the Rule Against Perpetuities, rather
than by the Rule itself.94
                                                                                                                      
92. On the naming controversy, see MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 325-27; J.H.C.
Morris & H.W.R. Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV. 486, 531 (1964). Though
Shakespeare’s Juliet thought otherwise, names do matter: In this instance, the want of a
name has sowed much confusion. See infra note 95.
93. See WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 421-22, 424
(1954); ASHBEL G. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
81-82 (1959) (analogizing an honorary trust to a fee simple determinable, which the author
points out is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities); ALBERT M. KALES, ESTATES,
FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 660 (1920);
MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 324-27; SIMES & SMITH, supra note 91, § 1394, at 249-
52; see also J.B. CLARK & J.G. ROSS MARTYN, THEOBALD ON WILLS 630-31 (15th ed. 1993);
JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY 359-60 (14th ed. 1993); RONALD H.
MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES 167 (1967); ROBERT MEGARRY & H.W.R.
WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 296 (5th ed. 1984); Philip Jamieson, Trusts for the
Maintenance of Particular Animals, 14 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 175, 181 (1987); William O.
Hart, Some Reflections on the Case of Re Chardon, 53 L.Q. REV. 24, 28 & passim (1937) (“a
bastard offshoot of the confused union of the two senses in which Gray speaks of the word
‘perpetuity’”); O.R. Marshall, The Failure of the Astor Trust, 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 151,
174-75 (1953); Joseph Warren, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920: Estates and Future In-
terests (pt. 2), 34 HARV. L. REV. 639, 647-48 (1921). For an early recognition of this duality,
see Clark, supra note 88, at 33-35. John Chipman Gray agreed that the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities “has nothing to do with” a trust for a noncharitable purpose. Nonetheless, he failed
to posit a parallel rule because he took the position that a trust for a noncharitable purpose
was void per se for want of a beneficiary. See GRAY, supra note 86, §§ 898, 906. Professor
Sweet, already quoted on this subject, see supra note 88 and accompanying text, endorsed
this view but subsequently altered it, arguing that alternative beneficiaries in the event of
nonperformance of an honorary trust hold contingent interests, hence subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities. See 2 THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 899 n.r. (Raymond
Jennings ed., 8th ed. 1951) (1st ed. 1841-43) (note by Sweet). This argument neglects the
fact that, as takers by right of reversion, the alternative beneficiaries’ interests are vested
by definition and therefore not subject to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities! See
Briant Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 60,
66-68 (1930). It has also been argued that because honorary trusts may be treated as akin to
powers, limitations on powers found within the main branch of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties are applicable. See A.K.R. Kiralfy, “Purpose Trusts,” Powers and Conditions, 14 CONV.
& PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 374, 375 (1950); Smith, supra, at 60; Briant Smith, Honorary Trusts and
Restraints on Alienation, 16 TEX. L. REV. 149 (1938). Simes criticized this position on the
ground that the analogy is imprecise; Leach simply pointed out that the argument is no-
where acknowledged in the case law. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 324-25; SIMES
& SMITH, supra note 91, § 1394, at 251-52; see also 2 SCOTT, supra note 20, § 124.1, at 248-
49 (simply noting the conflicting theories).
94. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 124 cmt. f, 418(2) (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 124 & cmts. b & f, 418(b) & cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 379
& cmt. a (1944). (Oddly, the matter is not treated in the Restatement (Second) of Property,
updating the Rule Against Perpetuities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 (1983).) Indeed, the Restators were too careful, adopting the
same phraseology in the case of a trust for indefinite noncharitable purposes, to be selected
by the trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 123 & cmt. f, 417(b) & cmt. a
(1959). Here, however, the interest is not vested; that is, it is contingent upon the trustee’s
selection, and so the Rule Against Perpetuities itself applies! Cf. supra note 90 and accom-
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Though few courts have taken pains to illuminate this distinc-
tion,95 its significance may be more than semantic. The application of
corollary doctrines within the Rule Against Perpetuities to the par-
allel rule governing noncharitable purpose trusts remains unclear.
Consider the case—quite common in fact—where a testator enjoins
performance of a purpose but fails to specify when the purpose shall
be carried out. According to the arcana of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, executors are assumed to be slothful—they are always a day
late, if not a dollar short. Hence, a bequest made contingent upon
circumstances existing “when my estate is probated” is void, on the
assumption that the executor might take forever to do so.96 Ordinar-
ily, the prospect of a slothful executor is of no consequence under the
Rule, for delays are not typically tied to contingencies—it makes no
difference under the Rule whether a bequest becomes possessory
now or in fifty years time, so long as we have already resolved who
the beneficiary is. But under the parallel rule requiring that trusts
for noncharitable purposes terminate within the perpetuities period,
the speed at which purposes are accomplished makes all the differ-
ence. Suppose, for example, a testator bequeaths a sum for the con-
struction of a monument but neglects to indicate precisely when it
must be built. Do we then assume, as we would under the Rule
Against Perpetuities, that the executor (or trustee) might not get
round to it until the perpetuities period had passed, thereby render-
ing the bequest void ab initio?
Most courts have held no, on the (usually implicit, although un-
thematic!) assumption that purposes that can be performed immedi-
ately are intended to be performed immediately and are analyzed
                                                                                                                      
panying text (on charitable trusts). For indefinite noncharitable purpose trust cases, see In
re Sutro’s Estate, 102 P. 920, 920-22 (Cal. 1909) (no terminal date specified); In re Estate of
Jones, 318 So. 2d 231, 232-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (distribution to be made over twenty-five
years); Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267, 267-69 (1873) (distribution to be made “from
time to time,” without specific limitation); Smith v. Pond, 107 A. 800, 801 (N.J. Ch. 1919)
(perpetual income endowment); Goetz v. Old Nat’l Bank, 84 S.E.2d 759, 773 (W.V. 1954) (no
terminal date specified).
95. For four exceptions, see Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474, 479 (Orphans’ Ct.
1974); Bliven v. Borden, 185 A. 239, 244-45 (R.I. 1936); In re Cain, 1950 V.L.R. 382, 391
(Vict.); In re Oldfield, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 175, 184-87 (Can.); and see also Devereux’s Estate, 48
Pa. D. & C. 491, 504 (Orphans’ Ct. 1943), appeal quashed, 46 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1946). But many
other courts refer to prolonged trusts for noncharitable purposes as violating “the Rule
Against Perpetuities” without elaboration or explanation, see, e.g., Foshee v. Republic Nat’l
Bank, 617 S.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Tex. 1981); McCartney v. Jacobs, 123 N.E. 557, 558-59 (Ill.
1919); Meehan v. Hurley, 150 A. 819, 820 (R.I. 1930); Morristown Trust Co. v. Mayor and
Bd. of Aldermen, 91 A. 736, 737 (N.J. Ch. 1913); Perry v. Twentieth Street Bank, 206 S.E.2d
421, 423 (W.V. 1974), while still other courts hold such trusts void without reference to any
rule at all, see, e.g., Travis v. Randolph, 112 S.W.2d 835, 835 (Tenn. 1938).
96. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
844-46 (5th ed. 1995) (noting a few contrary precedents); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a
Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 645 (1938) (examples 15 & 16) (deeming this to be the rule).
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under the parallel rule as if they will be performed immediately.97
On the other hand, if a testator calls for performance of a purpose
over a space of time—say, maintenance of a grave site—then most
courts have assumed, absent an explicit temporal limitation, that the
                                                                                                                      
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 418 cmt. b (1959) (asserting in connec-
tion with perpetuities limitations, but without elaboration or analysis, that “if property is . .
. bequeathed to a person to be applied by him to the erection of a monument . . . or . . . a
tomb . . . no resulting trust arises;” that is, perpetuities principles are satisfied); see also id.
§ 124 cmt. b (indicating that if an honorary trustee fails to carry out an honorary trust
within a “reasonable time,” the court can declare the trustee’s power to carry out the pur-
pose unexercised and terminate the interest; by analogy, a minority of courts have reasoned
in connection with interests in persons contingent on when an executor probates an estate
that the legal obligation to do so expeditiously ensures that the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities is satisfied, see Belfield v. Booth, 27 A. 585, 587 (Conn. 1893), and supra note
96). In one early case, where life (for once) imitated logic and an executor “long delay[ed]”
performing a bequest to say masses, the bequest was held valid notwithstanding that fact.
See Wilmes v. Tiernay, 174 N.W. 271, 273 (Iowa 1919). For additional cases, see Sherman v.
Baker, 40 A. 11, 12 (R.I. 1898) (where a bequest funded masses, it is “not in perpetuity” be-
cause it “takes effect at once”); In re Lennon’s Estate, 92 P. 870, 872 (Cal. 1907) (same);
Holland v. Smyth, 47 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 372, 373 (1886) (same); Leonard v. Haworth, 51 N.E. 7, 8
(Mass. 1898) (bequest to fund widow’s funeral expenses is valid, “as it would be completely
performed upon the decease of the testator’s wife”); Cochran v. McLaughlin, 24 A.2d 836,
838 (Conn. 1942) (indefinite purposes) (“These payments were to be made within such time
as might properly be taken to settle [the estate]”); In re Baeuchle’s Will, 82 N.Y.S.2d 371,
375 (Sur. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1950), aff’d mem., 93 N.E.2d 491 (1950) (bequest
of residuary to build a mausoleum held valid since “the trustees are empowered to expend
the residue at once”); Waller v. Sproles, 22 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1929) (distinguishing bequests
for the perpetual care of monuments, “of course . . . void under the rule against perpetui-
ties,” from bequests for the erection of monuments, which “cannot be said to violate the rule
against perpetuities”); Ford v. Ford’s Ex’r, 16 S.W. 451, 452 (Ky. 1891) (making the same
distinction); see also, e.g., Moran v. Moran, 73 N.W. 617, 621-22 (Iowa 1897) (bequest for
masses held valid without perpetuities analysis); In re Backes’s Will, 30 N.Y.S. 394, 395-96
(Sur. Ct. 1894) (same); In re Gorey’s Will, 170 N.Y.S. 635, 635-36 (Sur. Ct. 1918) (same); In
re Shanahan’s Estate, 112 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ohio 1953) (same); In re Koppikus’ Estate, 81 P.
732, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905) (bequest to build a monument held valid without perpetuities
analysis); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 349-52 (1883) (same); In re Young’s Estate,
157 N.Y.S. 494, 494-95 (Sur. Ct. 1915) (same); Bainbridge’s Appeal, 97 Pa. 482, 485-86 (1881)
(same); In re Stoffel’s Estate, 145 A. 70, 70-71 (Pa. 1929) (same); McIlvain v. Hockaday, 81
S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1904) (same); Callin Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 376, 380-81 (Orphans’
Ct. 1961) (same, dicta); Williams v. Herrick, 32 A. 913, 913 (R.I. 1895) (dicta that bequests to
build a monument are valid because “[t]hey relate to something to be done immediately, and
ended”); Trimmer v. Danby, 25 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 424, 426-27 (V.C. 1856) (bequest to build a
monument held valid without perpetuities analysis); Masters v. Masters, 24 Eng. Rep. 454,
454-56 (M.R. 1717) (validity conceded without perpetuities analysis); Adnam v. Cole, 49
Eng. Rep. 862, 864 (M.R. 1843) (same); In re Dulles’ Estate, 67 A. 49, 49-51 (Pa. 1907) (in-
definite purposes) (no perpetuities analysis); In re Endacott, 3 All E.R. 562, 569 (Ch. App.
1959) (dicta); Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass’n, 86 N.E. 1044, 1045-47 (Ill. 1908) (bequest
for perpetual care of monument is void, but bequest for purchase of monument is valid
without analysis). But see Morristown Trust Co. v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen, 91 A. 736,
737 (N.J. Ch. 1913) (bequest to build a flagstaff within a park upon consent of the municipal
authorities held void because “violative of the rule against perpetuities”); Wilson v. Flowers,
277 A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1971) (indefinite purposes) (immediate bequest “void . . . for a viola-
tion of the rule against perpetuities”) (dicta); Goetz v. Old Nat’l Bank, 84 S.E.2d 759, 773
(W.V. 1954) (indefinite purposes) (“no time is fixed in the will for [the trustees] to finally
dispose of the property”).
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testator meant to carry it out forever, in violation of the parallel
rule.98
Likewise, courts have usually held invalid trusts to provide sup-
port for the lives of pet animals because they might continue too
long, unless expressly limited to some human life or lives and/or
twenty-one years.99 Yet, strikingly, there are some contrary prece-
dents. In one case, where a testator sought to create a trust for the
care of an animal for the rest of its life, the court, “[b]y simple
mathematical computation,” reasoned that the fund would be ex-
hausted within three years, and so contained an implicit “time limit .
. . much less than the maximum period allowed under the rule
against perpetuities.”100 This approach is wrong, at least by analogy
to the classical Rule Against Perpetuities. For purposes of deter-
mining whether a future interest satisfies the Rule, one ignores ac-
tual or anticipated depletions of the fund that provides it.101 Do this
and other “What-Might-Happen” doctrines not apply to the parallel
rule? If that is so, the court in the instant case failed to make the
principle explicit, and neither the Restators nor the treatise writers
have addressed the issue. To this day it remains unresolved.102
                                                                                                                      
98. For cases in which trusts lacking express provisions for duration were assumed to
be intended as perpetual, see, for example, Alexander v. House, 54 A.2d 510, 511-12 (Conn.
1947); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 3 A.2d 236, 238
(R.I. 1938), aff’d, 7 A.2d 205 (R.I. 1939). But see In re Budge, 1942 N.Z.L.R. 350, 352-53
(adopting the construction principle that where a testator fails to specify how long a pur-
pose trust will endure, she is presumed to intend that it terminate within a space of time
allowed by law). In a very few cases, courts have given effect to perpetual trusts for the care
of graves without discussion of the perpetuities issue. See Hammond v. Stringer, 258
S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Ark. 1953); Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Williams, 96 A.
795, 796 (Del. 1914); Delaware Trust Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 95 A.2d 569, 575-76 (Del.
1953) (recognizing that Williams was wrongly decided under perpetuities doctrine, but de-
clining to overrule it, given widespread reliance on the decision); Security Trust Co. v. Wil-
lett, 97 A.2d 112, 113 (Del. Ch. 1953) (same); see also infra note 134 (noting special statutory
rules concerning trusts for the care of graves).
99. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 cmt. h (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 cmt. i (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§
124 cmt. f, 418 cmt. b (1959); In re Howells’ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932), modified,
261 N.Y.S. 859 (Sur. Ct. 1933); In re Mills’ Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re
1932 Kelly, I.R. 255 (court not indicated).
100. In re Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
101. Professor Leach dubbed this the “Magic Gravel Pit” doctrine. See MORRIS &
LEACH, supra note 87, at 73-74. Oddly, however, Professor Leach raised no question about
the court’s analysis in Searight. See id. at 324.
102. For a case rejecting the analysis found in Searight, see Meehan v. Hurley, 150 A.
819, 820 (R.I. 1930) (holding void a bequest to care for a grave till the fund was exhausted,
despite calculations that it would run out within seven years). Cf. Leonard v. Haworth, 51
N.E. 7, 8-9 (Mass. 1898) (where the court’s analysis of the validity of a noncharitable pur-
pose trust may have neglected, by analogy, the “Unborn Widow” doctrine). In several other
American cases, however, courts have given effect to trusts for the care of animals for the
rest of their lives, without regard to the application of durational rules, apparently because
the issue was not raised by contestants. See In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 711-12 (Ariz. 1966);
Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 740-41 (Ky. 1923); Wrenshall’s Estate, 72 Pa. Super. Ct.
258, 259-62 (1919). In Great Britain, several courts have also upheld trusts for the lifetime
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Also unresolved is whether a trust that violates the parallel rule
can be reformed.103 In the absence of statutory authority, a court
could conceivably sever a void purpose trust into annual install-
ments and thereby give effect to it for the first twenty-one years. The
Restators raise this possibility, but do not pass judgment on it.104
Statutes in a number of states have authorized courts to modify void
future interests, deleting remote contingencies in order to render the
interests valid with as small violence as possible to the testator’s in-
tent.105 Whether this statutory authority extends to violations of the
parallel rule, so that a court could re-write a trust for a nonchari-
table purpose to expire within the perpetuities period instead of
failing altogether, is in most jurisdictions unspecified and has never
come before a court for construction.106 Certainly, one would presume
that the public policy of effectuating intent so nearly as the law al-
                                                                                                                      
care of animals, in one early instance apparently by allowing the animal to be used as a
measuring life, and in another by taking judicial notice of the animal’s life-expectancy.
Commentators consider neither analysis sound. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at
322-23; 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ¶ 588, at 46-7 (Don R. Castle-
man rev., rev. ed. 1998); J.G. RIDDALL, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 178 & n.14 (4th ed. 1992); L.A.
Sheridan, Trusts for Non-Charitable Purposes, 17 CONV. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 51-53, 59-61
(1953).
103. Of course, like a future interest in persons, a trust for a noncharitable purpose can
always be self-reforming by inclusion of a saving clause. See In re Hooper, 1931 All E.R. 129,
130 (Ch.); Pirbright v. Salwey, W.N., Aug. 8, 1896, at 86, 86 (court not indicated).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. f (1959), which asserts that the
issue “is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject,” though neither is it
treated by the Restatement of the subject within whose scope it is: namely, the Restatement
of Property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS pt. 1 (1983) (ad-
dressing the Rule Against Perpetuities). Have Alphonse and Gaston taken the field here?
The notion of severing future interests into annual segments was first promoted by Profes-
sor Gray in connection with discretionary trusts, but Gray’s dictum has found little support
in the published cases. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 96, at 865-66. As yet, only
one American court has ever taken this approach in connection with a noncharitable pur-
pose trust. See Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474, 479, 483 (Orphans’ Ct. 1974). Two foreign
courts have also followed this course. See In re Kelly, 1932 I.R. 255, 261-64 (court not indi-
cated); In re Budge, 1942 N.Z.L.R. 350, 351-53. But cf. In re Producers’ Defence Fund, 1954
V.L.R. 246, 255-56 (Vict.) (rejecting severance theory).
105. In a very few jurisdictions, courts have presumed to modify future interests with-
out statutory authorization. See, e.g., In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423, 430 & n.13
(Miss. 1989).
106. One treatise assumes this breadth application, though without analysis of the rele-
vant perpetuities statutes. See 2 SCOTT, supra note 20, § 124.1, at 250-51. In fact, only one
state statute asserting a general power to reform void future interests has been drafted so
as explicitly to apply both to the principal and to the parallel rule, referring to judicial modi-
fication of an interest that “violates the rule against perpetuities or a rule or policy corol-
lary thereto.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (West 1986) (emphasis added). Other state statutes
refer to modifications of interests that violate (simply) the Rule Against Perpetuities. See,
e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (An-
derson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75 (West 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501
(1998); cf. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.043(d) (West 1984 & Supp. 1999) (allowing modification of
“noncharitable gifts and trusts” that violate “the rule against perpetuities,” but without ex-
press reference to trusts for purposes).
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lows applies with equal force to both branches of perpetuities doc-
trine, but this issue too remains unsettled.
And lastly, there is the doubtful relevance of “wait-and-see” rules,
allowing a court in some jurisdictions to delay finding an interest
void under the Rule Against Perpetuities until time reveals whether
the interest actually does vest remotely or not. Does this principle
also apply to durational uncertainties under the parallel rule? If so,
trusts for the care of specified animals until their deaths could run
for twenty-one years, in order to determine whether the interests
terminated within that period, as the parallel rule requires.
In adopting the wait-and-see approach, the Restators speak of
waiting to see whether the interest “does not vest” within the pa-
rameters of the Rule—language that is not strictly applicable to
trusts for definite purposes, which lack contingencies but nonethe-
less have to satisfy durational limits.107 State statutes adopting wait-
and-see often use the same inapt terminology.108 Yet, a number of
scholars (albeit without analysis) have read wait-and-see doctrine to
encompass cases governed by the parallel rule.109 Some have even
suggested that wait-and-see doctrine could apply to a trust for a non-
charitable purpose set to continue indefinitely or until a date-certain
beyond the perpetuities period, in order to give it effect for twenty-
one years.110 This suggestion appears erroneous. If a court can de-
termine initially that an interest will surely vest remotely (by anal-
ogy), then there is nothing more to “see” by waiting, and the doctrine
is inapplicable. On this point (if not others), the Restatement is crys-
tal clear.111
In light of all this substantive underdevelopment and slender
authority, the Commissioners’ decision in the 1980s to draft a uni-
form act covering perpetuities law presented a unique opportunity to
resolve the problems of the parallel rule. Unfortunately, as promul-
gated in 1986, the Uniform Statutory Rule failed explicitly to treat
noncharitable purpose trusts at all. Whereas the perpetuities stat-
utes of Great Britain and several other Commonwealth countries—
all predating the uniform act and familiar to the Commissioners—
                                                                                                                      
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
108. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(c) (Michie 1995). But cf., e.g., KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 381.216 (Michie 1972) (under which courts wait to see “whether an interest would
violate the rule against perpetuities,” without reference to vesting, but without explicit ex-
tension to the parallel rule); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Anderson 1994) (same).
109. See 2 SCOTT, supra note 20, § 124.2, at 251; infra note 110.
110. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 96, at 672-73; SIMES & SMITH, supra
note 91, § 1394, at 129 (Supp.) (“probably”); Dukeminier, supra note 88, at 1702-04.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 cmt. e
(1983); see also id. § 1.4, reporter’s note 5. Professor Leach’s original proposal for wait-and-
see likewise called for waiting until we have ascertained “those facts” with which “we shall
be able to decide the issue.” W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 728-30 (1952).
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l predating the uniform act and familiar to the Commissioners—had
not neglected this aspect of perpetuities law,112 the Uniform Statu-
tory Rule does so. Indeed, in respect of purpose trusts, the Uniform
Statutory Rule must actually be accounted worse than useless: For,
as we shall see, its legal relevance is unclear and so, instead of strip-
ping away the uncertainties of preexisting doctrine, it perversely
adds a second layer of ambiguity.
By its plain language, the Uniform Statutory Rule applies only to
a “nonvested property interest,” giving it effect either if it satisfies
the common law rule or if, when we wait-and-see, it happens to vest
vel non within ninety years.113 As we have observed, a trust for a
definite purpose, not subject to a condition precedent, is vested.114
Hence, trusts for charitable purposes can continue in perpetuity,
both under the common law and under the Uniform Statutory
Rule.115 As far as trusts for definite noncharitable purposes are con-
cerned, the Uniform Statutory Rule is silent: Nowhere does it limit
                                                                                                                      
112. The perpetuities act of Great Britain applies the traditional perpetuities period to
trusts for noncharitable purposes, even as it has modified the Rule Against Perpetuities ap-
plicable to ordinary trusts for persons to a set term of eighty years. See Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55, §§ 1, 15(4) (Eng.). The same is true in New Zealand and the
Australian state of Victoria, except that these acts allow the trust to “be applied for the
purposes . . . during the perpetuities period, but not thereafter;” that is, the trust is not void
per se if it violates the parallel rule. An Act to Effect Reforms in the Rule of Law Commonly
Known as the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964, no. 47, § 20 (N.Z.); VICT. STAT. no. 7750, § 18
(1968). In New South Wales, the period applicable to trusts for noncharitable purposes and
ordinary trusts for persons is a symmetrical eighty years. See N.S.W. PUB. ACTS no. 43, §§
7(1), 16(2) (1984). In four Canadian provinces, perpetuities legislation gives effect to trusts
for definite noncharitable purposes for up to twenty-one years; but trusts intended to en-
dure in perpetuity may be held void ab initio if the court finds that this would more closely
approximate the testator’s intent than a modified twenty-one-year term. See R.S.A. ch. P-4,
§ 20 (1980); R.S.B.C. ch. 321, § 21 (1979); R.S.O. ch. 113, § 16 (1966); S.Y.T. ch. 129, § 20
(1986); see also infra note 134 (trust havens). For commentary interpreting the British per-
petuities act as it pertains to noncharitable purpose trusts, which is not perfectly clear, see
John A. Andrews, Gifts to Purposes and Institutions, 29 CONV. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 165, 169-
70 (1965); J.F. Garner, The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 28 CONV. & PROP.
LAW. (n.s.) 333, 340 (1964); Morris & Wade, supra note 92, at 530-31; cf. MAUDSLEY, supra
note 93, at 177-78. For a comparison between other aspects of the British act and the Uni-
form Statutory Rule (but ignoring this one) by the Commissioner who served as Reporter
for the Uniform Statutory Rule, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Wait-and-See: The New
American Uniform Act on Perpetuities, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234 (1987).
113. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a) & cmt. B (amended 1990),
8B U.L.A. 333, 336-43 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a) (amended
1993). The Commissioners used the term “nonvested” as a synonym for the conventional
concept of “contingent.” See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 570 n.2 (1986).
114. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. On the other hand, a trust for indefinite
noncharitable purposes remains contingent until the purposes are selected and so is limited
by the Uniform Statutory Rule to ninety years. See supra note 94.
115. Following the common law, the Uniform Statutory Rule permits in perpetuity “a
nonvested . . . interest held by a charity, . . . if the nonvested . . . interest is preceded by an
interest held by another charity.” UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4(5)
(amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 370 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-904(5)
(amended 1993). Thus, though not vested, a trust in perpetuity for indefinite charitable
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the duration of interests.116 Construed strictly, then, and barring ad-
ditional legislative intervention in jurisdictions that have passed the
Uniform Statutory Rule, the common law continues to prevail with
respect to noncharitable purpose trusts, and the prior legal parallel-
ism between the Rule Against Perpetuities and its unnamed coun-
terpart exists no longer.117
This would seem, in fact, the logical conclusion to draw—were the
doctrinal waters not muddied by a further reference to the Uniform
Statutory Rule tucked away in the Uniform Probate Code. As al-
ready remarked, the revised Code adopts the Uniform Statutory
Rule, but also includes an optional section specifically devoted to the
validity—and temporal boundaries—of noncharitable purpose trusts.
We shall return to the optional section in just a moment. But for
now, notice that the accompanying comment informs us that “if this
optional provision is enacted, a new subsection . . . should be added,”
earlier on, to the Code’s list of exceptions from the purview of the
Uniform Statutory Rule, in order “to avoid an overlap or conflict” be-
tween that Rule and the optional section, and thus “mak[ing] it clear
that [the optional section] is the exclusive provision applicable to
property interests” of this sort.118 And so, it seems the Commission-
ers do contemplate that the Uniform Statutory Rule, when standing
                                                                                                                      
purposes remains valid under the Uniform Statutory Rule, and we can also conclude by
negative inference that a trust for a definite charitable purpose that is not subject to a con-
dition precedent is deemed vested by the Uniform Statutory Rule and hence can also con-
tinue in perpetuity. See also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
116. Actually, the Uniform Statutory Rule requires that a nonvested property interest
“vest or terminate” within ninety years, and the latter verb in one of its senses does refer to
duration. But that is not the sense in which the Commissioners use the verb: By “termi-
nate,” they mean “is lost;” that is, the relevant contingency is resolved against the holder of
the contingent interest. At any rate, this provision applies only to a nonvested interest. See
UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a) & cmt. B (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A.
333, 336-43 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a) (amended 1993).
117. The Uniform Statutory Rule “supersedes the rule of the common law known as the
rule against perpetuities,” without reference to any kindred or parallel rules; furthermore,
the Uniform Statutory Rule expressly “does not apply to . . . a property interest . . . or ar-
rangement that was not subject to the common-law rule against perpetuities.” UNIF.
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 4(7), 9 (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 370, 381
(1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-904(7), 2-906 (amended 1993). This inter-
pretation is also thematic with the Uniform Statutory Rule’s approach to gap-filling: “[A]
subsidiary doctrine [of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities] is superseded by this Act
only to the extent the provisions of the Act conflict with it.” UNIF. STATUTORY RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. & cmt. H (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 334-35, 352-56 (1993
& Supp. 1998). This same legal uncoupling occurred by express provision under the British
act and several of its Commonwealth counterparts. See supra note 112.
118. UNIF. PROBATE CODE pt. 9, sub-pt. 2, general cmt. (amended 1993). The list of ex-
ceptions that otherwise accompanies the Uniform Statutory Rule makes no reference to
trusts for noncharitable purposes. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4
(amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 370 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-904
(amended 1993).
940 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:913
alone, speaks to noncharitable purpose trusts after all.119 But how
does it do so? The Commissioners’ comment, offering instructions to
“make [the Code] clear,” simultaneously renders the Uniform Statu-
tory Rule anything but.
The only conceivable answer is that the Commissioners have im-
plicitly adopted the view of a small minority of scholars that honor-
ary trusts for definite noncharitable purposes should be treated, at
least with respect to perpetuities analysis, as special powers of ap-
pointment, which then fall under the main branch of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, rather than a parallel rule.120 In that case,
trusts for noncharitable purposes under the Uniform Statutory Rule
could persist for ninety years.121 But does this interpretation not
press the limits of conceivability? Is it truly possible, as a matter of
hermeneutics, that the Commissioners have insinuated into the Uni-
form Statutory Rule an unorthodox theory of honorary trusts, one
that has never found expression in a single common law case,122
without any explicit statement of statutory intent?123 Alas, silence in
the law rarely speaks its proverbial volumes, and the Commission-
ers’ uncommunicativeness on the matter of purpose trusts leaves
                                                                                                                      
119. Several scholars have assumed that the Uniform Statutory Rule applies to trusts
for definite noncharitable purposes, though without statutory analysis. See DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 96, at 673, 888; LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY
LAW 845 (2d ed. 1997) (this reference is a significant ipse dixit, since one of the co-authors,
Lawrence Waggoner, was himself Reporter for the Uniform Statutory Rule, though the as-
sertion is again made without any statutory analysis); James S. Chase, Perpetuities Reform:
How Much Do We Need?, 11 PROB. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1992); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1042-43
(1987).
120. See supra note 93. An alternative hypothesis might be that the Commissioners’
comment in the Uniform Probate Code referred only to trusts for indefinite noncharitable
purposes, which—as nonvested interests—do come under the main branch of the Rule
Against Perpetuities and, as such, are covered by the Uniform Statutory Rule and limited to
ninety years, see supra notes 94, 113 and accompanying text, a limit now revised by the op-
tional section, see infra note 125 and accompanying text. But this cannot be, for the Com-
missioners’ comment had also appeared in the unamended, 1990 version of the Code, whose
optional section had not covered trusts for indefinite noncharitable purposes! See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE pt. 9, sub-pt. 2, general cmt. (9th ed. 1991); supra notes 148-50 and accom-
panying text.
121. Under the Uniform Statutory Rule, a special power is permitted to last for ninety
years, and it can also be reformed to terminate within that span. See UNIF. STATUTORY
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 1(c)(2), 3(1) (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 333-34, 364-65
(1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901(c)(2), 2-903(1) (amended 1993).
122. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 324-25; cf. Barton v. Parrott, 495 N.E.2d
973, 976 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1984) (asserting that a trust for a definite noncharitable purpose
was unvested, without explanation or analysis).
123. In point of fact, it seems most unlikely that the Commissioners contemplated
whether, or how, the Uniform Statutory Rule applied to trusts for noncharitable purposes
when it was initially promulgated in 1986. None of the voluminous comments accompanying
the Uniform Statutory Rule are addressed to the issue; nor was the issue addressed in the
Commissioners’ scholarly exposés. See Waggoner, supra note 113. The subsequent reference
to the issue in the revised Uniform Probate Code of 1990 was, under the circumstances, al-
most certainly an afterthought.
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their treatment to an estate planner’s imagination.124 This consti-
tutes a tangible, if tangential, slip in the Uniform Statutory Rule’s
draftsmanship, and state lawmakers who enact it without revision
do so at their peril.
By comparison, the optional section directly following the Uni-
form Statutory Rule within the Code—though thinly adopted, as of
yet—is a model of clarity. Under the optional section, trusts for defi-
nite or indefinite noncharitable purposes “may be performed for [21]
years but no longer, whether or not the terms of the trust contem-
plate a longer duration.”125 Trusts that might, or certainly would,
continue beyond that point are reformed to last for up to twenty-one
years. Hence, under the optional section testators can no longer
mandate that noncharitable purpose trusts run for specified meas-
uring lives plus twenty-one years, as they could under the common
law;126 extraneous measuring lives have been spliced out of the time-
line. On the other hand, under the optional section a trust “for the
care of a designated domestic or pet animal” is valid for the entire
life of the animal.127 Thus, trusts for the care of long-lived animals
                                                                                                                      
124. The issue has not been raised as of yet in a published case.
125. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993). The Commissioners bracketed
the twenty-one-year time limit “to indicate that an enacting state may select a different fig-
ure.” Id. § 2-907 cmt. To date, none has done so.
126. See, e.g., Angus v. Noble, 46 A. 278, 279-82 (Conn. 1900) (trust for upkeep of graves
to continue for named lives in being); Leonard v. Haworth, 51 N.E. 7, 8 (Mass. 1898). The
optional section’s durational rule, giving effect to noncharitable purpose trusts for up to
twenty-one years and reforming them if necessary to last no longer, also appears in several
non-Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15211 (West 1991 & Supp.
1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.055 (West 1992) (slightly ambiguous, in that it could be read to
permit validity for the full perpetuities period and allow reformation to twenty-one years
only if it might violate the perpetuities rule); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-145 (1995). Cf. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 701.11(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998) (giving effect to honorary trusts without
establishing a durational rule, hence leaving the common law in place, but compare infra
note 134).
127. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993). Though not defined in the Code,
the term “a designated domesticated or pet animal,” id. § 2-907(b), presumably includes a
stabled horse, caged bird, or tank fish, but does not include plant life. Nor, by virtue of the
designation requirement and the legislative history noted below, does it include the unborn
offspring of a living animal. Hence, a trust for the care of a tree, or for the care of offspring
of a pet animal, can only continue for twenty-one years. See id. § 2-907(a). Nor, on strict
reading, does the terminology “a designated . . . animal” cover consolidated trusts for all the
pet animals that I own at my death, which then could persist for only twenty-one years. See
id. § 2-907 (a) & (b). During the plenary reading of the optional section prior to its enact-
ment in 1990, a Commissioner had objected to the absence of a definition of the term “ani-
mal,” but his criticism was ignored. As a consequence, litigation could ensue over the issue.
See Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at 134. The allowance of life-long bequests for the care
of pets first appeared under the technical amendments of 1993. As originally promulgated
in 1990, the revised Uniform Probate Code terminated trusts for the care of pets after
twenty-one years. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b)(2) (9th ed. 1991); see also UNIF.
PROBATE CODE app. X, § 2-907(b)(2) (amended 1993) (technical amendments). Whereas the
original section validating trusts for the care of pets also applied to trusts for the care of
their offspring, offspring were excluded from the analogous section under the technical
amendments. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) & cmt. (9th ed. 1991), with UNIF.
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are effective, despite the common law convention that measuring
lives must be human lives.128
As a matter of public policy, these provisions invite criticism at
several levels. One is the limited scope of the reformation doctrine
applied by them. Under the Uniform Statutory Rule, a void bequest
can be reformed “in a manner that most closely approximates the
transferor’s manifested plan of distribution.”129 If (as is unclear) the
Uniform Statutory Rule covers noncharitable purpose trusts, a court
faced with, say, a perpetual trust for care of a grave would have room
to reform the interest substantively, perhaps by changing the pur-
pose after ninety years to embellishment of the cemetery as a whole.
The trust could then persist in perpetuity, given that it would there-
after serve a charitable purpose. Under the optional section, how-
ever, this room is closed off; a court can only reform a noncharitable
purpose trust temporally, by cutting it short to twenty-one years,
though a revision of substantive purpose might more nearly ap-
proach the testator’s intent. The same is true of trusts for indefinite
                                                                                                                      
PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993); see also id. app. X, § 2-907(b) (technical amend-
ments); Technical Amendments, supra note 50, at 106-07 (“Explanation of Technical
Amendments”). When the optional section was first debated at its plenary reading, two
Commissioners had called attention to the problem of long-lived animals, but their concerns
were not addressed until passage of the technical amendments, save for a reference in the
original comment accompanying the optional section, raising the possibility of this reform.
See Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at 133-34, 137-38; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt.
(9th ed. 1991); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE app. X, § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993) (technical
amendments); Technical Amendments, supra note 50, at 106-07 (“Explanation of Technical
Amendments”).
128. Two non-Uniform Probate Code states have also adopted this rule. See CAL. PROB.
CODE § 15212 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-147 (1995); cf. N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999) (giving effect to trusts for
the care of pets for up to twenty-one years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-118 (1996) (same).
Durational rules equivalent to those found in the optional section appear in the discussion
draft of the Uniform Trust Act. See UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 406(a), 407(1) (Discussion Draft,
Feb. 9, 1999). Compare the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, establishing
a vaguer but more flexible reasonability standard: A trust for a noncharitable purpose is
permitted to endure “for a reasonable period of time, normally not to exceed 21 years.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2,, Mar. 10, 1999). In the
case of trusts for the care of a pet, the court could set that limit at the life of the pet; in the
case of trusts for the care of a grave, the limit could be the lives of the testator’s surviving
spouse and children; in the case of trusts for indefinite noncharitable purposes, the limit
could be twenty-one years. See id. § 47 cmts. b, c, & d. This approach harks back to the
early history of the Rule Against Perpetuities, when courts also judged the validity of ordi-
nary future interests in persons according to a looser, equitable standard of decision; only
gradually did the Rule harden into a rule of law. In light of qualitative variations in the ap-
plication of dead hand control to bequests for persons, a collaborator and I have elsewhere
raised the possibility of restoring flexibility to the main branch of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. But the cost of doing so, even in the presence of articulated standards and helpful
illustrations, as in the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third), is a marginal increase in
uncertainty and litigation. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 55 n.223 & passim (1992).
129. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3 (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A.
364-65 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-903 (amended 1993).
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noncharitable purposes (treated identically by the optional sec-
tion):130 Circumstances could well indicate that a testator would pre-
fer that her gift in perpetuity for “benevolent purposes” be reformed
by restricting it to perpetual charitable purposes, rather than to a
broader range of purposes for only twenty-one years.131
The core issue, however, is whether noncharitable purpose trusts
should be subject to a time limit so restrictive as this. If passed on its
own, the Uniform Statutory Rule does not alter fundamentally pre-
existing perpetuities policy, because its ninety-year limit for the
resolution of contingencies serves as a rough-and-ready surrogate for
the common law limit of lives in being plus twenty-one years.
Though it radically simplifies the structure of perpetuities doctrine,
the Uniform Statutory Rule does so without radically adjusting the
traditional scope of testamentary freedom.132 Accordingly, whether or
not the ninety-year limit created by the Uniform Statutory Rule is
construed to cover trusts for definite noncharitable purposes, the du-
rational restraints that apply to them will remain more-or-less con-
stant and, as under the common law, substantively (though possibly
not structurally) equivalent to the restraints that apply to contingent
future interests. The optional section is another story. Under the
Code, trusts containing contingent interests in persons can persist
for ninety years, whereas trusts for definite and even indefinite non-
charitable purposes (other than provisions for pet animals) must end
after twenty-one.133 The optional section thus curtails testamentary
freedom as compared to the common law and does so asymmetrically,
only with respect to purpose trusts.134
                                                                                                                      
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131. Often, courts read such broad phrases as synonymous with “charitable” initially,
but the question of what the testator intends by her phrasing is, in any case, an issue of
construction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 398 cmt. b (1959). Perpetual trusts
for indefinite charitable purposes are valid. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
132. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES prefatory note (amended
1990), 8B U.L.A. 325-29 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (justifying the ninety-year period on this ba-
sis). Professor Dukeminier has counterargued, however, that the ninety-year rule renders
the exercise of extended dead hand control a simpler matter and so will tend functionally to
extend the duration of trusts. See Dukeminier, supra note 119, at 1028-43; see also Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 128, at 2 n.4 (noting further references on this debate).
133. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901(a), 2-907(a) (amended 1993).
134. A majority of American jurisdictions has moved in the opposite direction as con-
cerns one sort of noncharitable purpose trust, the trust for care of a cemetery lot, allowing
this type of trust to persist in perpetuity. For fairly up-to-date statutory compilations, see
4A SCOTT, supra note 20, § 374.9, at 236 n.13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.6,
statutory note 3 (1983); see also supra notes 29, 55. Several American jurisdictions have
also abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities in its entirety, although whether these stat-
utes are intended also to abolish the parallel common law rule restricting the duration of
trusts for noncharitable purposes is unclear from the language used. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 503(a) (1989 & Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 305/3(a-5), 305/4(a)(8) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Mi-
chie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998); see also ALASKA STAT. §
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Is this rollback justified? The comment accompanying the op-
tional section offers no rationale, persuasive or otherwise.135 I have
elsewhere addressed the public policy of temporal restraints on pur-
pose trusts at some length.136 Put briefly: Though a noncharitable
purpose trust contributes little or nothing (by definition) to the pub-
lic welfare, it nonetheless produces private benefits—either for that
segment of society which relishes the purpose,137 or for the testator
herself138—no less substantial than those generated by garden-
variety trusts for family members. Consequently, like trusts for per-
sons, trusts for noncharitable purposes should be allowed to allocate
property so long as the allocations they make remain premised on a
testator’s knowledgeable judgments. Divisions of property among a
testator’s family members are bound to become arbitrary after pre-
cisely one generation has passed, because the relative needs of indi-
vidual members of the generation following are unknown to her;
whence, the common law’s restriction of future interests to lives in
being (plus the custodial period of their children). But the same can-
not be said of trusts for purposes. Here, it is the testator’s social
knowledge that renders a trust thoughtful, and hence durably bene-
ficial, yet the extent to which that knowledge will remain current
over time is uncertain: Social change, rendering a trust for a purpose
arbitrary, occurs at a clip that is as unpredictable as it is variable,
depending upon the aspect of society to which the trust purpose per-
tains. The ideal rule, then, appears the same flexible standard that
has always applied to charitable trusts—allowing them to endure so
                                                                                                                      
34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998) (discussed in David G. Shaftel, Newest Developments in
Alaska Law Encourage Use of Alaska Trusts, 26 EST. PLAN. 51, 52 (1999)); A. 2804 §§ 13-16,
208th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. 1999) (bill to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, passed by
both houses but awaiting gubernatorial disposition). In recent years a number of foreign ju-
risdictions specializing in trust services have offered testators the opportunity to establish
noncharitable purpose trusts for extended periods; on the Isle of Jersey, the applicable pe-
riod is 100 years. See Gould, supra note 65, at 90. On Guernsey the period is 100 years, and
in Belize it is 120 years. See MARTIN, supra note 93, at 374 n.41.
135. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). Professor Lawrence Wag-
goner, the Reporter for both the Uniform Statutory Rule and the revised Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code, observes vaguely: “Some commentators have worried about the du-
ration of . . . [honorary] trusts . . . [for] 90 years. The Uniform Probate Code avoids the
problem, however, by providing . . . that the duration of honorary trust[s] is limited to 21
years.” WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 119, at 845. During the plenary reading of the sec-
tion, Waggoner stated without elaboration that “[y]ou’ve got to have some cutoff,” but had
no assertive view on what the time limit should be. See Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at
133-34; see also infra note 157.
136. The remainder of this paragraph summarizes my analysis in Hirsch, supra note 2,
at 84-91.
137. A trust for the noncharitable “social” purpose of yacht-racing, for example, benefits
that group of individuals who take pleasure in the sport. See In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649
(App.).
138. Noncharitable trusts for “personal” purposes, such as care of a grave, give anticipa-
tory satisfaction to the testator while she remains alive.
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long as they continue to deliver benefits efficiently, and then updat-
ing them, via cy pres, whenever (and if ever) they decay into obsoles-
cence.
The Commissioners’ preference for an inflexible limit can be ques-
tioned on this basis, but their adoption of an abbreviated limit is par-
ticularly dubious, creating senseless inconsistencies by comparison
with other limits that obtain under the Code. Consider, by way of
contrast, a trust restricted to some use (yacht-racing expenses, let us
say) by the members of a class. Under the Code’s Uniform Statutory
Rule, a restriction as to use applied to defined class members can
continue for ninety years;139 such a trust may or may not appeal to
these persons, depending on their taste in sports. But when a use re-
striction takes the form of a trust for a noncharitable purpose (here,
to promote yacht-racing), its duration is tightened under the Code’s
optional section to twenty-one years. Yet, not being limited to de-
fined persons, such a trust can in fact do more good, because now the
“class” of eligible beneficiaries is infinite and hence more likely to in-
clude persons who will appreciate the bequest.
Notice, incidentally, that this same truncated span applies under
the optional section even when the testator doesn’t restrict the use of
a trust for purposes and hence avoids all risk of obsolescence. A trust
for any “benevolent” purposes selected by the living hand of the trus-
tee still must terminate after twenty-one years.140 Such a trust, I
submit, could continue for ninety years—or, for that matter, indefi-
nitely—without violating any public policy associated with the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
What is more, testators operating under the Code can evade the
twenty-one-year restriction by placing comparable provisions in
other legal packages. Instead of settling an enforceable trust to sup-
port yacht-racing, the testator could create a special power of ap-
pointment for the support of yacht-racing. Though authority is con-
fined to unconsummated dicta, special powers for noncharitable pur-
poses do appear to be valid under the common law.141 These are not
covered by the optional section142 but fall rather under the Uniform
Statutory Rule, limiting the exercise of a special power to ninety (not
                                                                                                                      
139. No special limitation pertains to trusts for persons or classes containing use re-
strictions. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a)(2) & cmt. H (amended
1990), 8B U.L.A. 333, 354 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a)(2)
(amended 1993).
140. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993).
141. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 320-21; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 40 n.25, 43
n.38, 92 n.216.
142. The optional section only pertains to trusts. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (a),
(b) (amended 1993).
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twenty-one) years.143 And there are even more durable alternatives
at a testator’s disposal: She could contract with a corporate entity to
perform a purpose after her death. Once again, the optional section
fails to apply.144 Interests created by contract are exempt from tem-
poral limits under the common law,145 and the Commissioners have
carried this exemption forward into the Uniform Statutory Rule.146
Hence, under the Code—as under the common law—a testator can
contract for performance of a noncharitable purpose in perpetuity.147
Similarly, a testator can make a bequest to a corporate entity subject
to a condition subsequent that the corpus reverts to the testator’s es-
tate upon the entity’s failure to continue performing a noncharitable
purpose. By longstanding precedent, conditions subsequent followed
by possibilities of reverter are valid in perpetuity under the common
law,148 and the Commissioners have done nothing to change it.149 If
                                                                                                                      
143. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 (c) (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A.
333-34 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901 (c) (amended 1993).
144. See supra note 142.
145. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 91, § 1246; cf. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966
P.2d 852, 856-59 (Utah 1998). The testator could execute the contract inter vivos and either
pay the contract price to the corporate entity immediately or agree to pay the sum to the
corporate entity by will, upon her death. See Gilman v. McArdle, 2 N.E. 464, 467-69 (N.Y.
1885). The interest thereby created in the corporate entity is then vested, in any event.
146. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4(1) (amended 1990), 8B
U.L.A. 381 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (excluding from its purview nonvested interests created by
contracts other than nonvested interests created by contracts to make wills); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-904(1) (amended 1993).
147. For common law cases reaching this result, see Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 22 S.W.2d
370, 372 (Ark. 1929) (contract for perpetual grave care, dicta); French v. Kensico Cemetery,
30 N.Y.S.2d 737, 737-38 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (contract for perpetual grave care); Kahlmeyer v.
Green-Wood Cemetery, 23 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (same). Nonetheless, the succes-
sor(s) in interest to the promisee’s rights could reach an accord with the promisor to termi-
nate the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981). Bilateral mo-
nopoly problems and social norms may operate to deter such an accord, however.
148. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 91, § 1239. Very similarly, under the common law a
testator can validly bequeath a corpus to one charity subject to a perpetual condition subse-
quent—here, that the charity perform some noncharitable purpose—with a gift over to an-
other charity if and when the first charity ever fails to perform the condition. See id. § 1280;
supra note 90 and accompanying text. For common law cases giving effect in perpetuity to
both of these constructs where they were used to effectuate noncharitable purposes, see In
re Murray’s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (bequest subject to a condition that
beneficiary provide care for a pet animal for the duration of its life); In re Andrews’ Estate,
228 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (same, dicta); Betts v. Snyder, 19 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa.
1941) (same, dicta); In re Chardon, 1928 Ch. 464, 467-70 (bequest to a corporation condi-
tioned on continuing to provide grave care in perpetuity); In re Chambers’ Will Trusts, 1950
Ch. 267, 267-68 (same); Estate of Campbell, 20 Cal. App. 3d 474, 478-80 (1971) (same);
Dunne v. Minsor, 143 N.E. 842, 842-45 (Ill. 1924) (same); Giblin v. Giblin, 182 N.W. 357, 359
(Wis. 1921) (same); In re Tyler, [1891] 3 Ch. 252, 254-60 (App.) (bequest to a charity in per-
petuity with a gift over to another charity on failure to provide grave care); In re Lopes,
[1931] 2 Ch. 130, 137 (same); In re Martin, 1952 W.N. 339, 340 (Ch.) (same); see also In re
Johnston’s Will, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-26 (App. Div. 1950), aff’d, 98 N.E.2d 895 (1951) (hold-
ing a bequest to remain in effect without the condition of care for animals, when the condi-
tion failed because conservators sold the animals prior to the testator’s death); In re An-
drews’ Estate, 228 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (same result on similar facts). But see
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testators can see to the protracted or even perpetual performance of
noncharitable purposes under the Code by recourse to legal gim-
micks such as these, then why not permit them to achieve a similar
result directly?150
Even considered in isolation, the twenty-one-year limit chosen by
the Commissioners has no policy significance. As has often been the
case in our law, its appearance in the Code reflects history—or, more
precisely in this instance, historical glare. Plainly, the Commission-
ers have borrowed the number from the twenty-one-year period-in-
gross incorporated into the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.151
                                                                                                                      
In re Filkins’ Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125-26 (Sur. Ct. 1952) (holding void a bequest subject
to a condition subsequent that the beneficiary care for pet animals); cf. In re Davies, [1915]
1 Ch. 543, 548-49 (holding void a bequest because incorrectly framed as a gift over from a
charity to a noncharity); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 21 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 596, 599-600 (1851) (holding void a
bequest because incorrectly framed as a gift over to a charity impressed with the same obli-
gation); In re Dalziel, 1943 Ch. 277, 279-85 (holding void a bequest because incorrectly
framed as a bequest of funds to be used in part for the performance of a noncharitable pur-
pose, instead of a bequest of funds subject to a separate condition that the purpose is car-
ried out); In re Gassoit, 70 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 242, 242-43 (1901) (same); Kostarides v. Cent.
Trust Co., 122 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Mich. 1963) (similar facts); Giles v. Boston Fatherless &
Widows’ Soc’y, 92 Mass. 355, 357 (1865) (dicta questioning the validity of a perpetual condi-
tion). Again, however, the difficulty here from the testator’s perspective is that the holders
of the fee simple determinable and the possibility of reverter or executory interest could
bargain to consolidate their interests and thereby extinguish the contingency. Still, bilateral
monopoly problems and social norms may again serve to deter such action. Cf. supra note
147.
149. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 4(5), 4(7) & cmt. B
(amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 370, 373-74 (1993 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§
2-904(5), (7) (amended 1993). The final draft of the revised Uniform Probate Code had in-
cluded an optional section setting a (bracketed) thirty-year limit on conditions subsequent,
but the section was dropped at the eleventh hour out of concern that it trenched on legal
territory claimed by the drafters of the Uniform Marketable Title Act, then in progress. See
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-910 (Draft for Approval, July 13-20, 1990); Plenary Reading, su-
pra note 55, at 118-27. But, as finally promulgated, this second Act failed to address the
subject of forfeiture conditions. See UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT (1990), 13 U.L.A. 138
(Supp. 1997). Alphonse and Gaston again? See supra note 104. Nevertheless, modern stat-
utes in a number of jurisdictions do invalidate conditions subsequent after a fixed number of
years, most commonly thirty. For a tally, see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 91, § 1994 &
nn.44-50 (as updated by the supplement), and see also UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND
TRANSFERS ACT § 3-409 (1975), 14 U.L.A. 301 (1990 & Supp. 1997).
150. Estate planners are perfectly aware of these gimmicks. See Fratcher, supra note 1,
at 786-90. For an early recognition, see Note, Private Trusts for Indefinite Beneficiaries, 45
YALE L.J. 1515, 1515-16 (1936). Professors Scott and Leach had objected to the anomalous
validity of gifts over from one charity to another, conditioned on the provision of perpetual
noncharitable services. The Commissioners, however, appear oblivious to the whole issue.
See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 193-94; 2 SCOTT, supra note 20, § 124.2, at 259-61;
4A id., § 401.5, at 590-91; Scott, supra note 43, at 641-42; see also John H. Langbein, The
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650 n.133 (1995) (opining more
generally that the Rule Against Perpetuities ought to apply to dead hand control irrespec-
tive of whether it is exercised by creating property interests or by way of contract).
151. A number of commentators had also proposed this time limit, though without
analysis. See MAUDSLEY, supra note 93, at 178; Dukeminier, supra note 88, at 1702, 1704;
Dukeminier, supra note 119, at 1043; William F. Fratcher, The Missouri Perpetuities Act, 45
MO. L. REV. 240, 251-52 (1980). Certainly, the Commissioners were right to eliminate the
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In that context, the time limit chosen made sense: It is the period of
a child’s minority, following lives in being. An age contingency of
twenty-one years in an unborn person has the reasonable aim of en-
suring that she is old enough to handle money wisely when she
would otherwise become entitled to receive it.152 But age contingen-
cies do not bear on trusts for purposes, so the period of twenty-one
years—however conspicuous and distracting, given its historical us-
age—loses all trace of relevance. Here, we face the entirely different
question of deciding how much time will elapse before a purpose
trust becomes socially anachronistic or inefficient.
And the answer, of course, is that we cannot say: Obsolescence in
a shadowy future is unpredictable. That is why the cy pres doctrine
is ideally responsive, giving courts leeway to deal with the problem
as the need arises.153 But even assuming cy pres reform was not to
be,154 hence leaving in place the threat of obsolescence at least with
respect to trusts for definite noncharitable purposes, the Commis-
sioners ought to have pondered their limit with this precise concern
in mind.155 And that they failed to do:156 In statements recorded in
                                                                                                                      
concept of measuring lives from their limit, since life spans only have relevance in connec-
tion with future interests in persons. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 86.
152. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 87, at 68-69; LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE DEAD HAND 68-70 (1955).
153. The notion of expanding cy pres to noncharitable purpose trusts is hardly a radical
one. Various commentators have long advocated that cy pres apply to private trusts in gen-
eral, and modern statutes in a number of American jurisdictions grant courts discretion to
remove use restrictions from trusts for persons or to terminate use-restricted trusts at any
time when the restrictions become burdensome to private beneficiaries. See Paul G.
Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HAST.
L.J. 267 (1967); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 51 n.205 (citing additional references).
For statutes, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. §
456.590.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 7-1.6 (McKinney 1992 &
Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.66 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1996); PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6102 (West 1975 & Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.13 (West 1981 & Supp.
1997). Several of these statutes might be construed to apply to noncharitable purpose trusts
as they stand. On the Isle of Jersey, the cy pres doctrine applies to noncharitable purpose
trusts. See Gould, supra note 65, at 91.
154. The discussion draft of the Uniform Trust Act fails to expand the substantive scope
of the cy pres doctrine per se, but it does include a general provision allowing modification
of a trust in light of unanticipated circumstances that could apply to noncharitable purpose
trusts. See UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 408(b), 411 (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). Compare the
tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which is flexible on the front end, al-
lowing courts to limit trusts for noncharitable purposes to a period deemed reasonable in
light of the purpose. See supra note 128.
155. Another relevant concern, to be sure, is taxation of purpose trusts. This concern
has been raised in connection with ninety-year trusts for persons allowed under the Uni-
form Statutory Rule. See Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants from
Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417 (1996). But it is a question quite distinct from the sub-
stantive matter of trust duration, because lawmakers can provide for the periodic taxation
of any trust. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 91 n.210, 103 n.266.
156. Nor is there evidence in the legislative history that any consideration was ever
given to applying cy pres to noncharitable purpose trusts or to relaxing the usual time re-
strictions on trusts for indefinite noncharitable purposes (brought within the scope of the
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the legislative history, a lead drafter owned that the limit estab-
lished in the optional section was arrived at arbitrarily.157
By contrast to their casual disposal of this issue, the Commission-
ers’ decision to allow trusts for the care of an animal to last for the
life of the animal was a thoughtful and laudable innovation.158 Early
commentators had rejected this idea out of fear that testators would
exploit it to undermine the Rule Against Perpetuities, designating
longevous creatures as extraneous measuring lives for contingent in-
terests in persons, and thereby prolonging contingencies beyond hu-
man lives in being.159 By confining the measuring lives in question to
animals (not redwood trees, and so on) and by authorizing the use of
an animal measuring life only when it validates a trust to support
that same animal, the Commissioners have taken care to prevent a
testator from arrogating their nonhuman-measuring-lives doctrine
to undesirable ends.
Once a noncharitable purpose trust terminates, either according
to the terms of the will or upon reformation, who receives the cor-
pus? Following traditional principles, the optional section allows the
testator to designate a remainderman; absent express designation,
the corpus flows to the residuary legatees or heirs.160 But the Com-
missioners have decorated these normal guidelines with artlessly
                                                                                                                      
section by the technical amendments of 1993, see supra notes 49-50, 140 and accompanying
text).
157. When questioned about its provenance, the Reporter for the revised Article II con-
fessed that “[w]e used 21 years for no particular reason, frankly.” Plenary Reading, supra
note 55, at 133-34. Apparently in reaction to the question raised in plenary debate, the
Commissioners bracketed their time limit in the optional section, indicating that enacting
states were free to select a different time limit. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-911 &
cmt. (Draft for Approval, July 13-20, 1990) (compulsory time limit), with UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-907 & cmt. (amended 1993) (bracketed time limit). So, instead of devoting further
thought to an issue to which they had previously devoted no thought, the Commissioners
simply punted the question back to the states.
158. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. For prior commentary urging that
trusts for the care of living animals be valid for their lives, see James T. Brennan, Bequests
for the Care of Specific Animals, 6 DUQ. L. REV. 15, 21-23, 40 (1967-1968). In recent years it
has become fashionable in the United States to own exotic pets, some of which (tortoises
and parrots, for example) are quite longevous. See Jim Bodor, Pet Owners Take Fancy for
Exotic, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), Aug. 4, 1996, at A1. Hence, the social
need for legislation of this sort has increased. For earlier cases validating lifetime trusts for
animals, apparently by misapplying the common law rule, see supra notes 100-02 and ac-
companying text.
159. See GRAY, supra note 86, § 906; John C. Gray, Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose,
15 HARV. L. REV. 509, 530 (1902); Charles Sweet, The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 18 JURID. REV. 132, 136-37 (1906-07) (also noting the potential diffi-
culty of identifying the measuring life); In re Kelly, 1932 I.R. 255, 260-61 (court not indi-
cated); see also Note, Validity of Trusts in Favor of Animals, 42 YALE L.J. 1290, 1291-92
(1933) (observing that a distinction could be drawn between normal, short-lived pets and
other animals, but defending the traditional rule as furthering simplicity). The old argu-
ment is endorsed by at least one modern treatise. See DAVID B. PARKER & ANTHONY R.
MELLOWS, THE MODERN LAW OF TRUSTS 165 (1975).
160. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(2) (amended 1993).
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drafted refinements whose precise meanings are in several respects
unclear. Under the revised Uniform Probate Code, when a future in-
terest is held by heirs, they are determined at the time when the in-
terest becomes possessory, not at the testator’s death.161 This provi-
sion expressly applies to an interest held by heirs following a trust
for a noncharitable purpose.162 Similarly, under the revised Code, a
future interest in a named person is rebuttably construed to be con-
tingent on her survival to the time when it becomes possessory.163
This provision also expressly applies to the interest following a trust
for a noncharitable purpose when that interest is created by a re-
siduary clause; it does not expressly apply, however, when the testa-
tor designates a remainderman.164 By negative inference, then, we
would conclude that a residuary legatee or heir must survive to the
time when the remainder of a noncharitable purpose trust becomes
possessory, but a designated remainderman need not. This is at best
an ambiguity and at worst a pointless inconsistency created by im-
perfect drafting.165
Furthermore, according to the language of the optional section, a
residuary legatee takes the remainder following a noncharitable
purpose trust (only) if the trust “was created in a nonresiduary
clause.”166 On strict reading, then, if a testator were to divide the
residue itself—or her entire estate—between a noncharitable pur-
pose and a named person, the remainder would flow not to the
named residuary legatee, but to the heirs. This result contradicts the
modern rule, adopted elsewhere by the Code,167 treating divided re-
siduary bequests, and divided bequests of an entire estate, as
equivalent to class gifts. Here, careless drafting has saddled the op-
tional section with still another ambiguity and potential inconsis-
tency.
V.   CONCLUSION
Doubtless, I am a fastidious critic. And, criticism aside, I do not
want to ring down the curtain without rehearsing several of the uni-
form laws’ signal accomplishments. In particular, the opportunity
they create to execute enforceable trusts for noncharitable purposes,
                                                                                                                      
161. See id. § 2-711.
162. See id. § 2-907(c)(2)(iii).
163. See id. § 2-707.
164. See id. § 2-907(c)(3).
165. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901(3)(b)(III) & (c) (1998) (establishing remain-
dermen at the testator’s death); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1(c) (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 1999) (same under a non-Uniform Probate Code statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
36A-147(c)(3) (1995) (same).
166. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(2)(ii) (amended 1993).
167. See id. § 2-604(b) & cmt.
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slaying at long last the sacred cow of the beneficiary principle, mer-
its critical praise. So does the opportunity to maintain a trust for the
care of a pet animal for the remainder of that animal’s life. On bal-
ance, however, there is no getting around the judgment that, par-
ticularly regarding their nuts-and-bolts, the uniform laws relating to
trusts for purposes leave much to be desired. The applicable sections
are strewn with technical glitches and saturated with so much ambi-
guity that, without further revision, they present an unappealing
model. The Commissioners engaged in the current round of trust
law-modelling would be well advised to eschew their predecessors’
prototype.168
* * *
Were the culmination of this Article suggestions for the correction
of a few obscure provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, I would
long since have given it over as not worth the effort. But there are
some larger, more important morals to take home from this cri-
tique—morals related, curiously enough, to the very obscurity of the
task at hand.
One clear revelation is the inherent fallibility of the code-drafting
exercise. Its chief architects would have us believe that the revised
Uniform Probate Code was fashioned according to the standards of a
methodical, iterative protocol:
Uniform acts . . . are the result of a deliberative process that is
measured and lengthy. As proposed legislation goes through the
cycle of drafting and redrafting, many hands leave their imprint . . .
[and] a vast number of alternatives are consider and revised or
rejected en route to the final product.169
Alas, one detects a hint of mythology here. Truth be known, codes
are drafted by mortal folk, beset by all of the failings associated with
our condition. Though the history of the Uniform Probate Code has
yet to be written, a recent scholar looking into the drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code found, by comparison, a collection of un-
usually fine minds grappling with all-too-usual sorts of deadline
                                                                                                                      
168. Several previous discussion drafts of the Uniform Trust Act offered a carbon copy
of the optional section as an alternative to its freshly designed section. The current discus-
sion draft omits the carbon-copy, and so its authors appear to have dodged a bullet. Com-
pare, e.g., UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 2-105, [2-105] & cmt. (Discussion Draft, Oct. 13, 1997), with
UNIF. TRUST ACT §§ 406-07 (Discussion Draft, Feb. 9, 1999). Nonetheless, as it stands, the
Uniform Trust Act parrots the durational rules contained in the optional section. See supra
note 128.
169. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous
Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 877-78 (1992).
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pressures and funding pinches. The consequence was eleventh-hour
amendments and omissions even from that masterwork.170
In reality, not every section of a uniform code—or any code, for
that matter—is lavished with intensive care. The optional section we
have dissected in the last many pages is a case in point. It made its
debut only in the second of the three discussion drafts of the 1990
Code and underwent only one significant revision (more properly,
elaboration) prior to its promulgation,171 which itself borrowed—
amazingly, if not amusingly—in significant respects from language
proposed to the Commissioners, unsolicited, by a lay person.172 The
National Conference’s plenary debate on the optional section lasted
five minutes or so,173 and the 1993 revisions, causing difficulties of
construction and added process concerns, were presented as a
technical amendment and hence received the imprimatur of the
National Conference with no debate at all.174
And all of this is perfectly understandable! The problems ad-
dressed in this Article never stood at the forefront of the Commis-
sioners’ agenda. The bulk of their creative energies were spent on
reworking the Code in light of the perceived need to reduce legal
formalism, to provide for the rising frequency of probate-avoidance,
and to take account of the advent of multiple-marriage in America.175
Over salient matters such as the elective share and the dispensing
power, the Commissioners labored long and hard.176 But trusts for
purposes lay far removed from these “grand themes”177—and when
they came to draft the optional section the Commissioners sank to
the occasion, devoting to it “rather routine attention,” as one partici-
                                                                                                                      
170. See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1940-
49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 314-15, 338-40, 346-48 (1998).
171. Cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (Discussion Draft, July 29-Aug. 5, 1988) (not including a
section on purpose trusts); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-904(f) (Discussion Draft, Dec. 1-3,
1989) (including the first, skeletal version); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-911 [optional provi-
sion] & 2-911 [working version] (Discussion Draft, Feb. 2-4, 1990) (including a version vir-
tually identical to the final published version, except for minor differences in phraseology);
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-911 (Draft for Approval, July 13-20, 1990); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
2-907 (9th ed. 1991).
172. See supra note 13. The advocate who influenced the language of the optional sec-
tion, David Rees, “was a non-attorney from Houston, Texas. After he sent us this material,
we never heard from him again.” Letter from Katie Robinson, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to the author (April 4, 1996) (on file with author).
173. See Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at 132.
174. See Richard V. Wellman, Annual Report for 1992-93 of Joint Editorial Board for
the Uniform Probate Code 2 (n.d.) (unpublished document, on file with author); Minutes of
the Executive Committee [of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws], Midyear Meeting 2 (Feb. 6, 1993) (unpublished document, on file with author).
175. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, prefatory note (amended 1993); Langbein & Wag-
goner, supra note 169, at 873-75.
176. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -214, 2-503 (amended 1993).
177. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 169, at 873.
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pant recalls.178 Certainly, the attention it received in plenary debate
can best be described as lighthearted. The clipped discussion was in-
terrupted twelve times by laughter, and the Commissioner charged
with reading the section to the assembly became so giddy that he had
to retire from the podium.179 Of course, there is nothing the matter
with good fun, so long as it accompanies good thinking. But in this
instance, the Commissioners’ deliberations betrayed an air of dismis-
siveness—born, one can only surmise, out of a sense of the relative
paucity of the section’s significance.180
And that, surely, is the gist of the tale: Given the demands on
drafters’ time and powers of concentration, the warp-and-woof of a
code—any code—is prone to fray at its edges.181 In some instances,
imbalances of effort are manifest and quite dramatic. Compare, if
you will, the ninety-year limit found in the major provision the Uni-
form Statutory Rule with the twenty-one-year limit found in the mi-
nor optional section: The first limit, the Commissioners justified at
length, emphasizing that ninety years “is not an arbitrarily selected
period of time. On the contrary.”182 But as for the second, “We used
                                                                                                                      
178. Interview with Professor Eugene Scoles, a Commissioner sitting on the Joint Edi-
torial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (July 1996).
179. See Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at 128-38. The Commissioners are not the only
responsible body to have found humor in trusts for noncharitable purposes. Some judges
have also had difficulty maintaining their solemnity when presented with these cases. See,
e.g., In re Hill’s Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (Sur. Ct. 1965) (“Even an animal hater probably
would not complain if the bequest to benefit a dog was, figuratively, only a bone. But when
the bequest is substantial and, figuratively, a whole quarter of beef . . . .”); M’Caig v. Uni-
versity of Glasgow, 1907 Sess. Cas. 231, 243 (Scot.) (“and treating the matter as far as pos-
sible seriously . . . .”).
180. Professor John Langbein, the brilliant and usually serious-minded Commissioner
responsible for leading the discussion of the optional section set the tone when he began: “I
hadn’t realized until just now why it was that [Commissioner Richard] Wellman wanted me
to be in charge of reading this thing. I have now discovered that he has left me with the cats
and dogs.” As Langbein struggled to maintain a straight face, the Reporter for the revised
Article II, Lawrence Waggoner, piped up: “Can we get somebody sober up there?” Finally,
Langbein gave up (“I can’t read this!”) and Wellman took over for him. Plenary Reading, su-
pra note 55, at 128-29. After that, Commissioners wishing to raise questions had to protest
that they were being serious, see id. at 133, and one interesting matter raised by a Commis-
sioner—namely, how the optional section should be read in pari materia with the slayer
statute, suggesting the larger issue of how to deal with any effort by a residuary legatee to
accelerate the remainder following a noncharitable purpose trust—was drowned out in
hoots of laughter, see id. at 134; see also Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, No. 98-765, 1998
WL 889239 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 25, 1998) (where the court ordered termination of an honor-
ary trust and distribution to residuary legatees after the pets provided for by the honorary
trust “were put to sleep for health reasons”).
181. For another apparent example of this phenomenon manifested within the Uniform
Probate Code, see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Multijurisdictional Estates and Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1291, 1292-93 & passim (1992).
182. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. C(1) (amended 1990), 8B
U.L.A. 342 (1993 & Supp. 1998); accord supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing
the theoretical justification for the ninety-year limit).
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21 years for no particular reason, frankly.”183 Shot through with
anomalies and ambiguities, the optional section serves ultimately as
a warning of the diminishing dependability of code-making bodies, as
they press toward the fringe.
And so, it follows that we must regard our codes of law with a
suspicious—and not a jealous—eye. That includes model codes.
Rightly charmed by their work-product, the architects of the revised
Uniform Probate Code would prefer that it gain enactment verbatim.
“Perhaps the most disheartening part of the uniform law process,”
they complain,
is the travail of enacting these orphaned products when they are
made available to the states. . . . [C]ommittees of the state legisla-
ture . . . [have] a disposition to tinker in ways that are ill consid-
ered. . . . Our experience is that most variations that are intro-
duced into uniform laws at the local level are proposals that were
considered and rejected for good cause in the uniform law drafting
process.184
That is possibly so when we inspect the central provisions of a
uniform code.185 It is less likely to be so when we explore its outer
reaches, where provisions may well have received more cursory at-
tention. To foreclose local tinkering (quite apart from issues of sensi-
tivity to regional needs and traditions)186 would be to break a circuit
that on past occasions has provided Commissioners with valuable
feedback concerning the merits and flaws that legislative committees
                                                                                                                      
183. Plenary Reading, supra note 55, at 133-34 (statement by Reporter Lawrence Wag-
goner); see also supra note 157.
184. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 169, at 878. “The simple truth is that the state
enacting process seldom achieves the depth of review that characterizes the uniform law
drafting process.” Id. at 879.
185. Still, even central provisions of a uniform code may be weakened by information
bottlenecks. The National Conference of Commissioners provides no funding for empirical
research, which can be the key to identifying efficient default rules. The Uniform Probate
Code is largely composed of default rules, and its drafters seized on those scattered bits of
empirical evidence that could be found within the scholarly literature. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-102 cmt., 2-106 cmt., 2-302 cmt. (amended 1993). But where none was extant, the
drafters were reduced to intelligent guessing, and their guesses in some instances have
been questionable. See Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1096-97. Noting the Commissioners’ lack of
funding for empirical studies, see Waggoner, Poorly Drafted Trusts, supra note 9, at 2337-
38. For suggestions that uniform laws are also vulnerable to infection by interest group
politics, see, for example, Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV.
83 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 142-48 (1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). For several proposals for the
improvement of the uniform lawmaking process, see Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and
Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 351-57 (1999).
186. On specific points, some state assemblies may simply have fundamental policy dis-
agreements with the Commissioners. See, e.g., Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Geor-
gia’s New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 652-69 (1997); Richard V. Wellman,
Georgia Lawyers Revise Their Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 783, 806 (1997).
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detect in the many facets of their models. Such feedback enabled the
drafters of the original Uniform Probate Code to improve it in due
course.187 And those original drafters, incidentally, had welcomed all
those local efforts.188
Nor is conformity for conformity’s sake an overriding interest in
this area of the law. Once again, the architects of the revised Uni-
form Probate Code beg to differ: “Local variations cause the uniform
laws to lose the uniformity that is a great part of their value,” we are
told:
It is sometimes thought witty to contrast the field of probate [with
commercial law], on the ground that a decedent can only die in
one place. But that decedent can own property in many jurisdic-
tions, and because it is ever more common for people to change
domicile later in life, an estate plan that is crafted in one state
may come into effect in another.189
All true, to be sure—but of limited consequence. Estate planners
are hardly blind to this danger, and they can easily protect against
the unintended application of out-of-state default rules to their wills
by recourse to governing-law clauses.190 Even variations in the prin-
                                                                                                                      
187. “Since the Fall of 1971, the Board has monitored the legal literature concerning the
Code, searched reports about the Code by various bar and legislative study committees and
examined the eleven enactments to date of the Code, for ways of strengthening and im-
proving the Code.” This effort led to the technical amendments of 1975 “which show that
considerable thought and effort already have been expended in national attempts to im-
prove the Code,” and which in turn “should serve to reduce the tendency of local draftsmen
to make purely technical language and style changes.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE, at ix
(amended 1993) (1975 Technical Amendments); see also Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclec-
tic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 898 (1992).
The drafters of the revised Uniform Probate Code fully understand the need for feedback,
and they are not so foolish as to believe that “proposed uniform laws are always perfect.”
But they would prefer that such feedback be funnelled to them through the continuing Uni-
form Law Commission revision process. “In asking that local variations be resisted, we are
speaking to a process value.” Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 169, at 879. Yet, the Com-
missioners’ revision process takes time, and meanwhile the defective template of a uniform
provision may further replicate itself among the states. Are these drafters truly disap-
pointed that the legislators of Colorado have taken it upon themselves to correct flaws in
the optional section? See supra notes 59, 69, 165.
188. See Richard V. Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L. F.
536, 536, 542. Along with improvement-spotting, there is also the value of local experimen-
tation to consider. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unful-
filled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 482 (1960) (urging in connection with
charitable trust regulation that “[t]he concept of the states as laboratories for experimenta-
tion in social control is particularly relevant in this field”); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
189. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 169, at 878; see also Ribstein & Kobayashi, su-
pra note 185, at 150.
190. See 1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE
PLANNING § 14.08.4 (1982); Nancy G. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in Wills,
(pt. 1), 43 PRAC. LAW., June 1997, at 33, 34-35. The Uniform Probate Code explicitly vali-
dates governing-law clauses, hence (ironically) helping to diminish the need for uniformity.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 (amended 1993).
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cipal mandatory rule of probate law—the statute of wills, setting
will-execution formalities—have already been neutralized by wide-
spread passage of liberal conflict-of-law statutes.191 It is instructive
to recall that pressure for conformity did not drive the development
of the Uniform Probate Code—it arose out of a perceived need to
simplify cumbersome rules and procedures and thereby to salvage
the reputation of the probate system, which had fallen into low es-
tate.192 Local assemblies were not afraid to tinker with the Code
then,193 and they are doing so now: Already, in every jurisdiction
where it has been enacted, the revised Uniform Probate Code’s elec-
tive share provisions have undergone legislative modification—and
the sky has not fallen.194 Indeed, it may not be going too far to sug-
gest that the greatest accomplishment of both editions of the Uni-
form Probate Code has been to stir things up: galvanizing legislators
to blow the dust off their statute books and to contemplate anew as-
pects of local inheritance law that have become pointlessly wrinkled
or timeworn.
This is not to say that unifying the inheritance laws of our fifty
states would pay no dividends at all. In the trust field, especially,
competition for business has prompted a number of state legislatures
to embark on a dangerous “race to the bottom” in their recent enact-
ments.195 A truly uniform law of trusts would facilitate a collective-
                                                                                                                      
191. Again ironically, one such appears in the Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (amended 1993). In addition, estate planners can easily meet the
formal requirements of all fifty states by following well-publicized procedures that comply
universally with local requirements. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 96, at 224-
28. In similar fashion, estate planners routinely protect against violation of another manda-
tory rule of inheritance law, the Rule Against Perpetuities (which, in the wake of modern
statutory glosses, also varies from state to state) by adding to their wills perpetuities saving
clauses. See id. at 874-75.
192. See Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1068 n.36.
193. In fact, this is something of an understatement: In many jurisdictions, the original
Uniform Probate Code was chopped into bits and adopted piecemeal. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE (1969), 8 U.L.A. 1, 1-8 (1998).
194. See Susan N. Gary, Share and Share Alike? The UPC’s Elective Share, 12 PROB. &
PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 19.
195. Legislatures in several states have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities, at-
tracting trust business by offering settlors the opportunity to continue their trusts indefi-
nitely. See supra note 134. And in another development, 1997 saw two states enact legisla-
tion allowing settlors to self-settle spendthrift trusts within their borders, thereby offering
settlors a way to protect themselves from creditors’ claims. At the forefront of both of these
innovations was none other than Delaware—a state whose legislature already knew a thing
or two about downhill racing. In both instances, the Delawareans frankly admitted in the
legislative history that their motive in enacting these bills was “to maintain Delaware’s role
as the most favored domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts,” and noting that
the bill is “similar to legislation recently enacted in Alaska.” H.R. 356, 139th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Del. 1997) (synopsis) (trust statute); accord H.R. 245, 138th Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 1995) (syn-
opsis) (perpetuities statute); see also Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. Hompesch II,
Alaska vs. Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, 12 PROB. & PROP., Jan.-
Feb. 1998, at 32; Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and Form of the Trust at the New Mil-
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action response to this problem.196 But given (in both senses of the
word) the exhaustive quality of the code-modelling enterprise, even
tried hands will falter now and again. Ultimately, I am convinced,
we have more to gain by proceeding with disparate caution than in
lockstep.
And no more so than in dim corners like the one explored in this
Article. For just as the devil is in the details, so does he also prowl
the periphery. Without pervasive vigilance and thorough skepticism,
we shall never succeed in banishing him from our cathedral.
                                                                                                                      
lennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 571-75
(1998) (predicting that the “money center jurisdictions” will match these legislative innova-
tions); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 52 n.210 (criticizing statutes repealing the Rule
Against Perpetuities as it applies to trusts for persons); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts
and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 83-92 (1995)
(advocating the validity of self-settled spendthrift trusts under some conditions, hence sug-
gesting that the legislative moves in this direction thus far down the spiral do not amount
to bad policy, despite their dangerous motivations); John E. Sullivan, Gutting the Rule
Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore
Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423 (1998).
196. The “race to the bottom” is nothing other than a political variant of the well-known
common pool problem, whereby individuals have an incentive inefficiently to overconsume
common goods. For an economic discussion, see Garrett J. Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). In the instant case, the common good in question is the na-
tional supply of trust business. And just as collective action is the ideal solution to the com-
mon pool problem, so will it end the political race to the bottom. Commentators concerned
with the race to the bottom in corporate law have thus pressed the need for federalization.
For the classic discussion (which has spawned much further debate), see William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). But a
uniform law can also provide at least a framework for mutual cooperation among states,
and voluntary cooperation is another route to the salvation of collective action. See gener-
ally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). But cf. Edward J.
Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the
Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 579-80, 588-93 (1998) (suggesting that Commis-
sioners themselves might race to the bottom in the hope of gaining more widespread adop-
tion of their acts). For a suggestion that states can arrive at legal uniformity when it is in
their collective interest to do so, even without the assistance of a uniform lawmaking body,
see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evi-
dence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996).
For a suggestion that there exist, in any event, strong centripetal tendencies in American
law stemming from a variety of institutional factors, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Achieving
Uniformity in the Law, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
